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Abstract
Nutrient emissions from agricultural land are now widely recognized as one of the
key contributors to poor water quality in local lakes, rivers and streams. Nutrient
trading for non-point sources, including farm land, has been suggested as a regula-
tory tool to improve and protect water quality. However, farmers’ attitudes suggest
that they are resistant to making the changes required under such a scheme where
this requires them to adopt unfamiliar technologies and farm management prac-
tices.
This study develops a model of farmers’ resistance to change and how this
affects their adoption of new mitigation technologies under nutrient trading regu-
lation. We specify resistance as a bound on the adoption of new technologies and
allow this bound to relax as farmers’ resistance to change weakens.
Key words: agriculture, inertia, mitigation, nutrient trading, technology adop-
tion.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nutrient emissions from non-point sources, such as agricultural land, are increas-
ingly recognized as one of the key contributors to poor water quality. Declining
water quality is a serious problem in many developed countries, including New
Zealand, and in an increasing number of developing countries (Sutton et al. 2011,
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 2006). Mathematical modeling
of different approaches to improving water quality can help inform the decisions of
both policy makers and local stakeholders. However, some assumptions in the ex-
isting models that are necessary to make modeling tractable reduce the credibility of
the associated results. The development of a more flexible model that better reflects
reality is the focus of this research.
The static economic model for agent behavior under nutrient trading regu-
lation (such as used by Anastasiadis et al. 2011, in their NManager model) makes
several simplifying assumptions. These assumptions include: agents are willing
to change, agents respond optimally to a nitrogen price, and agents’ decisions are
independent of their past decisions and the decisions of other agents.1
However, in the context of farmers, evidence suggests these assumptions are
not a good representation of reality. Farmers have expressed a reluctance to change
where it involves the adoption of unfamiliar farm management practices or tech-
nologies (Fenemor et al. 2012); they tend to manage their business with a ten (or
more) year time horizon; and may have incentives to delay the adoption of new
practices or technologies in order to capitalize on learning opportunities (Sin 2012).
Furthermore, there is a well known psychological phenomenon where people and
organizations continue a familiar practice, even though a better one is available, un-
1We thank our audience at the New Zealand Agricultural and Resource Economics conference
(2011) for challenging these assumptions. Part of the motivation for this study is in response to this
feedback.
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til the cost of continuing with their current practice exceeds the cost of change (Ram
1987).
Designing a model to reflect the reality identified above is a challenging task.
It involves quantifying something that is difficult to identify and measure: farm-
ers’ willingness and motivation to change. Farmers’ willingness and motivation
to change will depend on time, their past behavior, and the past behavior of others
farmers. We define the term inertia to describe the nature of a system or agent (farm-
ers) that slows the speed at which they change. While this term appears to have a
similar meaning across a broad range of literature, modeling of agents’ inertia does
not appear to be widely established in practice.
It is important to study not only adoption but also resistance to adoption
(Ram 1987). In this study, we take a novel approach by specifying a model that
explicitly includes farmers’ inertia. The aim is to develop a model that can reflect
a range of complex behaviors observed in reality, without requiring unnecessarily
complex mathematical structures. Our ideal model will be not only robust but also
intuitive, so users and decision makers can understand its key aspects with ease.
While this is important for any model, it is essential in our case as we are taking a
less conventional approach.
The study is set out as follows: In the remainder of this chapter we review
some of the literature relevant to agricultural technology adoption, and briefly de-
scribe the workings of a nutrient trading scheme. In chapter 2 we specify our in-
ertia model, first in the general form and then with specific functional forms. The
performance of the model is demonstrated in chapters 3 and 4. These two chapters
consider analytical results in the two farmer case, and numerical results in the many
farmer case, respectively. How these results vary when inertia contains a stochastic
component is demonstrated in chapter 5. Parameter estimation and model valida-
tion is discussed in chapter 6, and chapter 7 concludes this study.
1.1 The adoption of new agricultural practices
Research into the factors that affect the adoption of new agricultural practices and
technologies has highlighted the importance of farmers’ social and professional net-
works. Foster & Rosenzweig (1995) use a modified version of the target-input model
and find that imperfect knowledge is a key barrier to the adoption of new seed va-
rieties for Indian households, and that households initially learn from their neigh-
bors’ experiences. Drawing on the same data, Munshi (2004) contrast wheat and
rice farmers to demonstrate that social learning is less prevalent where the perfor-
mance of the new technology (new seed varieties) is sensitive to unobservable char-
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acteristics. Bandiera & Rasul (2006) consider how Mozambique farmers’ adoption
decisions are influenced by the decisions of their networks. They find an inverted
U-shaped adoption curve: up to some point farmers become more likely to adopt
a new seed variety as the number of adopters in their network increases, but be-
yond this point farmers become less likely to adopt as the number of adopters in
their network increases (see figure 1 of Bandiera & Rasul 2006). Bandiera & Rasul
(2006) suggests that this decline in the likelihood of adoption may be due to strategic
behavior by farmers delaying adoption in order to capitalize on learning opportuni-
ties. Conley & Udry (2010) draw similar conclusions to Foster & Rosenzweig (1995)
but with respect to the growing of pineapples in Ghana. They surveyed individual
farmers to discover who they know and talk to about farming, this enabled them to
identify each farmer’s social network. They find that learning from other farmers
via networks is significant, even after controlling for spatial and serial correlation.
Farmers’ networks provide them with a wealth of information. However, the
literature suggests that it is not just the receipt of information that is important. Du-
flo et al. (2004) find that while information has a significant effect on the adoption
of fertilizer in rural Kenya, access to commitment strategies to finance the purchase
of fertilizer has a greater effect. Pannell et al. (2006) and Bewsell & Brown (2009)
investigate adoption by Australian and New Zealand farmers respectively. They
conclude that adoption is more likely where farmers can acquire first-hand, person-
alized information from trialling new technologies on their own farms. Hanna et al.
(2012) demonstrate a model where farmers fail to learn, not because they do not
have information, but because they fail to notice important features of the informa-
tion they already possess.
Meta-analyses of the drivers of adoption have been conducted for the United
States. Skinner & Staiger (2005) compare adoption rates of hybrid corn, tractors, and
β-blockers (for the treatment of heart attacks) across states. They find that high lev-
els of human and social capital (i.e. education and involvement in local networks)
are strongly associated with early adoption, while low financial costs of adoption
have a much weaker effect. A more recent meta-analysis by Baumgart-Getz et al.
(2012) highlights the importance of farmers’ connections to local networks, the qual-
ity of their information, and their access to finance. Farmers’ risk aversion does not
appear to have a significant effect on their technology adoption.
A less emphasized driver of farmers’ adoption decisions is farmers’ attitudes
to farming and to change. Dury et al. (2010) interviewed farmers in France and iden-
tify the following as farmer objectives: maximizing profit or income, establishing
and maintaining a secure source of income, and reducing or simplifying their work-
load. Connor et al. (2008) and Ward et al. (2008) give classifications of Australian
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farmers according to their attitudes towards how they manage their farm. The five
key elements of farmers’ attitudes they identify are: business focus, innovativeness,
willingness to learn, responsiveness to social influence, and environmental concern.
Description Business Innovative Willing Socially Envir.
focus to learn responsive concern
Business oriented 52% + -
Innovative 22% + + ++
Traditionalists 13% - - - - -
Table 1. Classification of farmers by Connor et al. (2008)
Description Business Innovative Willing Socially Envir.
focus to learn responsive concern
Socially influenced 52% - ++ -
Innovative 25% + + - -
Lifestyle 10% - - - - +
Capital Constrained 13% ++ ++
Table 2. Classification of farmers by Ward et al. (2008)
Tables 1 and 2 give the characteristics of farmers as classified by Connor et al.
(2008) and Ward et al. (2008). Cells containing + (++) indicate (very) strong pres-
ence of an attribute, and cells containing - (- -) indicate (very) weak presence of an
attribute. Blank cells indicate that the characteristic is not indicative of the corre-
sponding class of farmers. The remaining 13 percent of farmers from Connor et al.
(2008) are not described. In addition to the characteristics identified in table 2, the
farmers described by Ward et al. (2008) as capital constrained face significant capital
constraints.
Sin (2012) provides a framework for thinking about farmers’ decisions to
adopt new environmentally friendly technologies. Sin notes that delaying adop-
tion may be an optimal individual decision as it allows farmers to learn from earlier
adopters, take advantage of alternative technologies that might arise, and avoid ir-
reversible costs of adopting and locking-in inferior technologies. Where farmers’ in-
dividual adoption decisions are not socially optimal, Sin (2012) identify the roles for
regulatory intervention to encourage adoption. Results from Marshall (2008) sug-
gest that local government involvement has a stronger positive effect on the adop-
tion of conservation practices than regional government involvement.
A common approach when modeling individual agents’ adoption decisions
is to treat adoption as an irreversible binary decision: in some period agents make
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a step change from the old technology to the new technology. The key question un-
der this framework is when will agents adopt the new technology? Griliches (1957)
describes the proportion of the target population who have adopted a new technol-
ogy using an S-shaped function of the time since the technology became available.
Griliches fits these S-curves with logistic functions and characterizes them accord-
ing to three aspects: (i) origin, when the population begin to adopt; (ii) slope, the
speed of adoption; and (iii) ceiling, the total proportion who adopt. A review of the
approaches used more recently to study adoption and their data requirements has
been conducted by Besley & Case (1993).
Following the approach by Griliches (1957), Berger (2001) develops an agent-
based simulation model where agents learn about a new technology from observing
nearby agents who have already adopted it. As agents learn about the technology
they become more likely to adopt it. Ellison & Fudenberg (1993) also develop an
agent-based model, but allow agents to revise their choice of two technologies in
response to further learning. However, not all agents may revise their technology
choice each period, a property they call inertia. Ellison & Fudenberg (1993) appear
to be the first to use the term inertia with respect to modeling agents’ decisions to
adopt new technology.
Our work in this study is consistent with the approach taken by Dong &
Saha (1998) who develop a double-limit hurdle model that separates the decision
“whether to adopt?” from the decision “how much to adopt?” Instead of consider-
ing the adoption of specific mitigation practices and technologies, we treat adoption
as a continuous decision. Rather than deciding when to adopt, in each period farm-
ers decide whether, and how much more, to adopt new technologies.
1.2 Nutrient trading schemes
We will frequently discuss the development of our inertia model in the context of a
trading scheme for nutrient emissions. In this section we provide a brief overview of
nutrient trading schemes and their application to farms (or, more generally, diffuse
emitters of nutrients). A list of key terms is given in appendix A.
The key nutrients emitted by agricultural activities in New Zealand are nitro-
gen and phosphorus. Increased levels of these nutrients in local water bodies leads
to reduced water clarity and increased algal growth. The resulting concentrations
of algae lead to eutrophication of water ways, are harmful to fish, and in sufficient
quantities can be poisonous to humans and livestock (Carpenter et al. 1998, Parlia-
mentary Commissioner for the Environment 2006).
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Nitrogen and phosphorus tend to enter the farming system via the applica-
tion of fertilizers and the importing of feed for livestock. Some of these nutrients
leave the farm as produce: milk, meat, fiber and crops. Of the nutrients that do
not leave the farm as produce, a proportion remain in the soil and plants but the
rest is lost from the farm as nutrient emissions into local water ways (such as rivers,
streams, and lakes) or into groundwater (underground bodies of water).
In New Zealand, farms’ nutrient losses can be estimated using the OVER-
SEER software tool developed by AgResearch (2009). This gives farms’ long run av-
erage nutrient losses as a function of farm management practices, including: farm
type, output produced, stocking rate, fertilizer use, imported feed, area for effluent
irrigation, and the use of mitigation technologies (nitrogen inhibitors, wintering and
stand-off pads); and farm location, including: slope, rainfall, soil type and drainage.
Where a local water body (lake, bay, river or stream) is suffering from envi-
ronmental degradation due to high nutrient levels, regulation may be introduced
on those farms that contribute emissions to the water body. The catchment is the
land area within which nutrient emissions lead to increased levels of nutrients in
the local water body. So all farms within the catchment will be subject to regulation.
One design of regulation for managing nutrient emissions is a nutrient emis-
sions trading scheme. Under an emissions trading scheme the regulator provides
a fixed supply of annual allowances. Each allowance entitles the bearer to emit a
single unit of nutrients. At the start of each regulatory period, farmers receive or
purchase an initial allocation of allowances. During the period, farmers are free to
buy and sell allowances. At the end of the regulatory period, farmers must surren-
der sufficient allowances to cover the nutrient emissions from their property for that
period. Farmers with insufficient allowances to cover their intended emissions must
either purchase unused allowances from farmers with excess allowances, reduce
their emissions, or risk non-compliance. By controlling the supply of allowances a
regulator can manage the total amount of nutrient emissions.
A trading scheme is theoretically desirable, as it encourages mitigation to
occur where it is most cost effective.2 Profit-maximizing farmers will mitigate as
long as the cost of mitigation is less than the value of the allowances they would
otherwise have to hold. This implies that the price of allowances will be such that
all allowances are used and each farmer is indifferent between further mitigation
2Cost effective mitigation is theoretically possible with any design of regulation. However, in
order for more prescriptive regulation to be cost effective the regulator needs a significant amount of
information from farmers. As farmers are seldom willing to share financially sensitive information
and may have incentives to provide incorrect information, we anticipate that prescriptive regulation
is seldom as cost effective as trading regulation.
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and purchasing additional allowances. It follows that under a trading scheme the
least costly mitigation activities will take place first.3
For a more general introduction to the literature on environmental trading
schemes we recommend Tietenberg (2006). Barnes & Breslow (2001) provide a good
introduction to the application of emissions trading for air quality, and Kerr et al.
(2012) provide a good introduction to the application of nutrient trading for wa-
ter quality. Horan & Shortle (2011) discuss how the reality of nutrient trading fre-
quently differs from the theoretical ideal.
3A trading scheme may also encourage more efficient technology adoption decisions as suggested
by Kerr & Newell (2003) in the context of the U.S. petroleum industry’s phase-down of lead in gaso-
line.
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Chapter 2
The Inertia Model
Next we consider a farmer faced with regulatory pressure to reduce nutrient emis-
sions. The farmer can either adopt new mitigation technologies and practices de-
signed to lower the cost of reducing emissions, or can attempt to reduce emissions
given their current technologies and practices. The adoption of new technologies is
potentially threatening to the farmer or the farm business as it will involve risk and
learning new or unfamiliar activities. In contrast, managing with current technolo-
gies is likely to be less threatening to the farmer and, while costly in the long run,
will be more comfortable in the short run. In this chapter we develop our model of
when and how much farmers will adopt new technologies in response to nutrient
regulation.
With regard to specific technologies or practices, we anticipate abatement ac-
tivities in the short run might include fencing waterways, reducing fertilizer appli-
cations, introducing nitrogen inhibitors, and decreasing stocking rates. Abatement
activities in the long run are likely to have capital costs and might include introduc-
ing feeding or winter pads, more advanced effluent management, the installation of
a herd home, and if necessary changes in farm type or location.
Although the optimal response to nutrient regulation must involve the adop-
tion of appropriate technologies and practices in the long run, farmers are likely
to be resistant to making certain changes in the short run. We will describe this
resistance as inertia. Farmers’ inertia will decline with time, as they seek more prof-
itable ways of managing their farms, and as farmers observe their neighbors making
changes on their own farms.
The passing of time gives farmers greater opportunity to learn and prepare
for change. Over time social and regulatory pressure will increase, and better tech-
nologies will become available. In addition, farmers’ existing technologies will de-
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preciate increasing the likelihood that farmers will replace them with new, and su-
perior, technologies.
Farming is a business and, while profit does not drive all farming activity,
many farmers have significant mortgages to repay (see for example Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry 2011, in the context of New Zeland farms). It follows that
under nutrient regulation farmers have incentives to improve the efficiency of their
farm’s management by adopting technologies that improve the cost effectiveness of
their current activities.
Farmers within the same catchment are often part of the same networks (so-
cial or professional) and therefore have opportunities to learn from each other. The
prevalence of network effects on farmers’ adoption decisions has been well estab-
lished in the literature (see for example Foster & Rosenzweig 1995, Conley & Udry
2010). Furthermore, farmers may have incentives to strategically delay adoption in
order to capitalize on learning from their peers (Bandiera & Rasul 2006).
The relative impacts of time, financial pressure and network effects on tech-
nology adoption decisions will differ between farmers. Building a model enables us
to observe and analyze the importance of different drivers of technology adoption,
and how progressive technology adoption affects the cost of nutrient regulation.
2.1 The general model
Consider a catchment containing several farms. Each farm is managed by a farmer
who chooses the level of inputs (animals, fertilizer, labor, capital) to put on their
farm and how much to adopt new mitigation technologies. Farms have two out-
puts: their production good (e.g., meat, milk, or fiber) that results in profit that is
collected by the farmer, and nutrient emissions (e.g., nitrogen or phosphorus) that
are a byproduct that results in environmental degradation. In general, more inten-
sive farms (i.e., farms with higher levels of inputs) generate both more profits and
more nutrient emissions.
The wider community is concerned about the environmental degradation
caused by farms’ nutrient emissions. However, this concern is not sufficient to mo-
tivate farmers to reduce emissions where these reductions are costly. As a result, the
community has asked the local government body to intervene in the catchment as a
regulator. The aim for regulatory intervention is to lower nutrient emissions in the
catchment to acceptable levels.
Farmers can theoretically achieve any level of nutrient emissions, without
adopting new technologies, by reducing their use of existing inputs. However, if
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a farm is profit maximizing with respect to their current emissions, lowering emis-
sions via reducing inputs is very costly to the farm business as it has a large impact
on profit.1 New mitigation technologies (and the associated practices) are designed
to lower the cost to the farmer of reducing nutrient emissions by making reductions
more cost effective. A farmer who adopts some new technology will be able to meet
any nutrient target at lower cost (with more profit) than a farmer who adopts no
technology. It follows that, where farmers are required to reduce nutrient emissions,
they have incentives to adopt new technology.
While farmers have incentives to adopt new technologies, they may be slow
to adopt due to their inertia. We consider a discrete time model of I farmers over T
consecutive time periods, t = 1, ..., T . Each period, farmers’ inertia will determine
what new technologies (and the associated practices) they are willing to adopt. As
farmers’ inertia changes over time they will become more willing to adopt new tech-
nologies.
The optimal decision in this context could be determined by a benevolent
social planner. The social planner’s aim is to maximize the combined profit of all
farmers, given that nutrient emissions from farming (nit) must not exceed specified
levels (N¯t), and that farmers face limits on their adoption of new technologies each
period. To accomplish this, the social planner chooses the use of technology (mit)
and inputs (θit) for all farmers i, (i = 1, ..., I) and time periods t, (t = 1, ..., T ).
In order to find the optimal combined profit for these I farmers over T time
periods, under the described constraints, the following constrained optimization
problem can be formulated:
max
∀i,t:θit,mit
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
1
(1 + r)t
pii(xit, θit,mit) (2.1)
s.t.: ∀t :
I∑
i=1
ni(xit, θit,mit) ≤ N¯t , (2.2)
∀i, t : ∆mit ≤ ∆m¯it(t,mi,t−1, {mj 6=i,t−1}) , (2.3)
∀i, t : θit,mit ≥ 0 ,
where
θit - is the decision variable that gives the use of all other inputs on farm i in
period t
1We will assume that farms are profit maximizing with respect to their current emissions. How-
ever in practice, farms may not be profit maximizing with respect to their current emissions and may
be able to carry out mitigation at very low (or negative) cost by changing their inputs: for example, a
farmer who is applying more nitrogen fertilizer than than his pasture can make effective use of might
improve profitability and reduce nitrogen loss by decreasing his fertilizer application.
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mit - is the decision variable that gives the use of technology on farm i in pe-
riod t
xit - gives various exogenous factors (such as prices, land quality, soil type,
and climate)
pii(·) - is the profit function of farmer i, and includes the revenue from produc-
tion, the cost of new technologies and the cost of all other inputs
ni(·) - gives the nutrient emissions (nit) of farm i as a function of farm inputs
N¯t - is the maximum acceptable level of nutrient emissions for the catchment
(the cap) in period t
∆mit - is the new technology adopted by farmer i in period t: ∆mit = mit−mi,t−1
∆m¯it(·) - gives the maximum amount of new technology farmer i is willing to
adopt in period t
r - is the discount rate, so the social planner accounts for the value of money
between periods2 and maximizes the net present value of all future prof-
its
We refer to (2.2) as the environmental constraint. The nutrient cap (N¯t) is
set outside the model by the regulator in response to advice from ecological and
hydrological scientists.
We refer to (2.3) as farmers’ inertia constraint. ∆mit = mit −mi,t−1 is the new
technology adopted by farmer i in period t, and ∆m¯it(·) gives the maximum amount
of new technology farmer i is willing to adopt in period t. Farmers’ adoption of new
technology is bounded by their willingness to adopt: ∆mit ≤ ∆m¯it.
Definition. A farmer’s inertia, m¯it, is the maximum amount of technology that farmer
i is willing to adopt by the end of period t: m¯it = mi,t−1 + ∆m¯it. Given this definition
farmers’ inertia constraint, (2.3) in the above optimization problem, is equivalent to ∀i, t :
mit ≤ m¯it.
Definition. A farmer’s inertia is binding if mit = m¯it.
Definition. A farmer’s inertia weakens as m¯it increases over time and farmers are willing
to adopt more technology.
In reality, as the inputs on a farm increase both the profit and nutrient emis-
sions of the farm also increase. However, beyond some point, profit ceases to in-
crease with inputs though nutrient emissions continue to increase. To reflect this
reality, we require that nutrient emissions are increasing with inputs,
∂ni
∂θit
≥ 0 ;
2The social planner prefers $ 1 today over $ 1 next year, and is indifferent between $ 1 today and
$ (1 + r) next year.
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profit is initially increasing with inputs (up to some level θui ),
θit ∈ [0, θui ]→
∂pii
∂θit
≥ 0 ;
and profit exhibits decreasing marginal returns with respect to inputs,
∂2pii
∂θ2it
< 0 .
These requirements ensure nutrient emissions are increasing with farm inputs, and
that there exists a finite, non-negative profit maximizing level of inputs (so given the
exogenous inputs, xit, profit maximizing farmers will seek to use the optimal level
of inputs, θ∗it, in order to earn the maximum possible profit, pi∗i (·) ).
It follows that farmers can decrease their nutrient emissions (nit) by reducing
their inputs (θit). However, lowering inputs results in reduced farm profits (unless
farmers’ current inputs exceed the profit maximizing level of inputs, θ∗it). The adop-
tion of new technologies improves the cost effectiveness of input reductions. So that
the same reduction in nutrient emissions can be achieved with a smaller reduction
in profit. We require that the change in profit with respect to inputs (∂pii/∂θit) is
initially decreasing with the adoption of technology (up to some level muit(θit)).
mit ∈ [0,muit(θit)]→
∂2pii
∂mit∂θit
< 0 .
This ensures that there is a financial benefit to farmers from adopting technology
(up to some point). This benefit may differ depending on a farm’s nutrient emis-
sions. In addition, it implies that there exists a finite, non-negative optimal level of
technology adoption.
The key contribution of our model is the inclusion of farmers’ inertia in the
social planner’s decision problem as given by (2.3). This extends the static economic
model for profit maximization given an environmental constraint (see for example
Tietenberg 2006). If farmers’ have no inertia (2.3) will always be non-binding, and
our model reduces to the static economic model (such at that given by Tietenberg
2006, chapter 2) as follows:
max
∀i,t:θit,mit
T∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
1
(1 + r)t
pii(xit, θit,mit) (2.4)
s.t.: ∀t :
I∑
i=1
ni(xit, θit,mit) ≤ N¯t , (2.5)
∀i, t : θit,mit ≥ 0 .
Note that farm profits, in period t, are additive in (2.1) and (2.4). This im-
plies that profits from different farms are equivalent and the social planner has no
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preference as to which farms generate the profits. While (2.1) could be adapted for
circumstances where the social planner has preferences regarding the distribution
of farm profits (perhaps caused by differences in farm types, interactions between
farms, or wider social impacts), we maintain the additive structure as it is important
for the construction of our solution algorithm in the next section.
One approach to finding a solution for the social planner’s decision problem,
is to specify it as a dynamic program and solve using backwards recursion. It is well
known that a dynamic program, with value function Vt, can be expressed as follows
(Bellman 1957):
Vt({mi,t−1}) = max∀i:θit,mit
( I∑
i=1
pii(xit, θit,mit) +
1
1 + r
Vt+1({mit})
)
s.t.
I∑
i=1
ni(xit, θit,mit) ≤ N¯t ,
∀i : ∆mit ≤ ∆m¯it(t,mi,t−1, {mj 6=i,t−1}) ,
∀i : θit,mit ≥ 0 .
Note that the state for the problem at time t is defined by the set of all farmers’
technology decisions in period t − 1 ({mi,t−1}). As a result, this problem rapidly
becomes computationally intractable as the number of farmers increases.
To make the decision problem tractable we solve it under the following ad-
ditional assumption: The social planner is short-sighted and optimizes within each
time period sequentially rather than over all time periods. The social planner’s de-
cision problem can then be expressed as a series of constrained optimization prob-
lems. The social planner’s optimization problem for time period t can be formulated
as follows:
max
∀i:θit,mit
I∑
i=1
pii(xit, θit,mit) (2.6)
s.t.
I∑
i=1
ni(xit, θit,mit) ≤ N¯t , (2.7)
∀i : ∆mit ≤ ∆m¯it(t,mi,t−1, {mj 6=i,t−1}) , (2.8)
∀i : θit,mit ≥ 0 ,
where (2.6) follows from (2.1) according to the short-sightedness assumption; and
(2.7) and (2.8) are the parts of (2.2) and (2.3) respectively that relate to time period t.
Note that we need not include the discounting factor ((1 + r)−t) in (2.6) as it reduces
to a multiplicative constant in this formulation.
Given the decision problem for period t, it is then straightforward to solve
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the social planner’s decision problem over all time periods using forward recursion
(see the algorithm in the following section). As any solution to the revised model,
given by (2.6) to (2.8), will also be a solution to the original model, given by (2.1)
to (2.3), solutions to the revised model will provide a lower bound on the objective
function of the original model.
2.2 The general farmer level model
In practice, it is difficult for a social planner to obtain farm specific information (i.e.,
to observe xit, pii(·) or nit(·)). This hinders their ability to solve the decision problem
(2.6) - (2.8).
An alternative to solving the social planner’s decision problem is to establish
a regulatory environment such that the result of farmers’ individual farm manage-
ment decisions will be identical to the result that would be obtained by the social
planner. The standard regulatory approach to accomplish this is a trading scheme.
Under a nutrient trading scheme the regulator provides a supply of allowances
equal to N¯t, with each allowance entitling the owner to emit one unit of nutrients.
Farmers can trade allowances between themselves, but must surrender sufficient al-
lowances to cover their emissions at the end of each period. The equilibrium price
of allowances (pt) is determined by the profit that can be earned from using them.
Given this price, farmers’ individual decisions will be identical to the equivalent
decisions made by the social planner. This can be demonstrated via the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker conditions (see Tietenberg 2006).
Following the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the constrained optimization
problem (2.6) - (2.8) implies the following optimization problem for each farmer i in
period t when nutrient trading regulation is introduced:
max
θit,mit
pii(xit, θit,mit)− pt ni(xit, θit,mit) (2.9)
s.t. ∆mit ≤ ∆m¯it(t,mi,t−1, {mj 6=i,t−1}) , (2.10)
θit,mit ≥ 0 ,
where the price of nutrient allowances faced by all farmers, pt ≥ 0, is determined
within the model to be the smallest price such that, given farmers’ input and tech-
nology decisions, their nutrient emissions satisfy the environmental constraint:
I∑
i=1
ni(xit, θit,mit) ≤ N¯t . (2.11)
It is straightforward to show that (2.9) follows from (2.6) and (2.7) according to the
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Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, (2.10) follows from (2.8), and (2.11) follows from
(2.7) when constructing a single farmer’s decision problem.
It follows that we can solve the model using a disaggregated or agent based
approach where individual farmers are the decision makers. As farmers’ inertia in
each period depends on decisions in the previous period, the following solution
algorithm solves the model using forwards recursion.
1. Each farmer observes the decisions of all other farmers (mj 6=i,t−1), and the re-
sulting nutrient price (pt−1), from the previous period.
2. Each farmer calculates the maximum amount of new technology that they are
willing to adopt this period (∆m¯it).
3. Each farmer constructs their demand schedule for nutrient allowances (ex-
pressing their intended nit for any given pt) by considering the nutrient emis-
sions that would result from the optimal decisions on their property (θit and
mit) for any given allowance price.
4. All farmers receive an initial allocation of allowances. Farmers will search
for and engage in mutually beneficial bilateral trades (as determined by their
demand schedules).3 Once all mutually beneficial trades have been exhausted,
the equilibrium price of allowances pt will be such that no farmer is willing to
sell an allowance for less than this price and no farmer is willing to buy an
allowance for more than this price.
5. All farmers exit the nutrient trading market with allowance holdings as deter-
mined by their demand schedules and the market price.
6. Each farmer chooses the technology and other inputs (mit and θit) for their
property that maximize their profit given their allowance holdings.
By the Coase Theorem, if we assume zero transaction (trading) costs, the final
allocation of allowances is independent of the initial allocation of allowances (Coase
1960). Hence all we are concerned with is: What is the price? And given the price,
how many allowances will each farmer hold? It follows that we need not specify
an initial allocation of allowances, or model the trading between farmers, and can
instead focus on the final allocation of allowances. For computational purposes it
will be equivalent to modify step four in the above algorithm as follows:
4. Farmers’ submit their demand schedules (constructed in step three) to a cen-
3A mutually beneficial trade occurs where two farmers meet and can find a price such that at
this price one farmer wishes to hold more allowances than they currently have and the other farmer
wishes to hold less allowances than they currently have. If such a price can be found then the first
farmer buys allowances from the second farmer at this price until, the trade is no longer mutually
beneficial.
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tral agency that determines the price of allowances (pt) such that total demand
for allowances equals the cap (the supply of allowances).
In the remainder of this chapter we will propose and justify specific func-
tional forms for the farm profit (pii) and farmer inertia functions (∆m¯it). These are
the functional forms we will assume for the remainder of the study.
2.3 Choice of decision variables
So far in our model, we have used θit to represent all inputs other than technology.
However, in reality there are many farm inputs (including stock, fertilizer, imported
feed, fencing materials, and labor) and the combination of these inputs, not just
the quantity, is important. Furthermore the same quantity of nutrient emissions
could be achieved using many different combinations of inputs. Incorporating in
our model the process by which inputs are converted to profits and emissions is
unnecessary and detracts from our focus on farmers’ inertia.
For any given farm-level nutrient target (and given technology) a skilled
farmer could determine the profit maximizing combination of inputs that will meet
this nutrient target. This implies that we do not need to consider the set of all pos-
sible combinations of inputs but can focus on the subset that would be used by a
skilled farmer to maximize profit. Note that by construction there exists a bijection
between this subset and the set of all feasible nit. Hence rather than treating θit as a
decision variable (so nutrient emissions are determined implicitly) it will be equiv-
alent to treat nit as the decision variable (so farm inputs are determined implicitly).
For our specific functional forms we will treat mit and nit as decision variables. To
simplify the notation, we will suppress xit and θit.
Recall from the previous section, that we require that there exists a finite,
non-negative profit maximizing level of inputs, and that the adoption of technology
improves the cost effectiveness of reductions in inputs. When we consider nit as a
decision variable, these requirements can be expressed as follows: profit is initially
increasing with nutrient emissions (up to some level nui ),
nit ∈ [0, nui ]→
∂pii
∂nit
≥ 0 ;
marginal profit is decreasing with nutrient emissions,
∂2pii
∂n2it
< 0 ;
and the change in profit with respect to nutrient emissions is initially decreasing
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with the adoption of technology (up to some level muit(nit)),
mit ∈ [0,muit(nit)]→
∂2pii
∂mit∂nit
< 0 .
The first two requirements ensure that higher profit from a farm results in increased
emissions, and that there exists a finite, non-negative profit maximizing level of
emissions. The third requirement ensures that farmers have a financial incentive
to adopt technology, and that there exists a finite, non-negative optimal level of
technology adoption.
2.4 Farm profit function
We will express farms’ profits as a function of their nutrient emissions (nit) and
their technology (mit).4 We propose the following functional form for farms’ profit
function.
pii(mit, nit) = ainit
2 + binit + ci + di(ei − nit −mit)2 − qimit , (2.12)
where
• ai, bi, ci and di are coefficients (ai < 0, di < 0 and bi > 0),
• ei is the farm’s baseline emissions (emissions at time t = 0 before regulation is
introduced),5
• qi ≥ 0 is the cost of technology to farmer i (including interest and depreciation).
This form extends that used by Anastasiadis et al. (2011), and can intuitively
be decomposed into three parts: The first three terms give profit from production
as a quadratic function of nutrient emissions; the fourth term provides a measure
of the difference between farmers’ current nutrient mitigation (ei − nit) and their
technology (mit); the fifth term accounts for the cost of technology.
We choose a quadratic form for the profit from production for its simplicity
and because it results in linear (or piece-wise linear) demand functions, as we will
see in figure 2, below. With quadratic polynomials it is straightforward to determine
coefficient values that ensure any sign restrictions will be satisfied. If profits from
production is determined by a more complex function, a quadratic form provides a
second order approximation.
Recall from the start of chapter 2 that farmers’ optimal responses to nutri-
ent regulation must involve the adoption of appropriate technologies and practices.
4In order to measure mit and nit using the same units, we may quantify a farm’s technology as
the amount of nutrients that the technology can help to cost effectively mitigate.
5In this study e always refers to a farm’s baseline emissions, it never refers to the natural exponent.
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The profit function (2.12) assumes that the appropriate technology is such that all, or
almost all, nutrient mitigation is supported by technology adoption (mit ≈ ei−nit).6
It follows that farms that adopt technology that is consistent with their nutrient re-
ductions should earn more profit. This is done in (2.12) by penalizing farmers who
adopt too little technology (mit < ei − nit) or too much technology (mit > ei − nit).7
We require a measure of difference between ei − nit and mit. Two standard ways of
quantifying the difference between two measures are to consider the absolute dif-
ference (|ei −mit − nit|) or the squared difference ((ei − nit −mit)2). We choose the
squared difference ((ei−nit−mit)2) for its mathematical elegance. Using the squared
difference ensures that the expression for farm profit (2.12) when mit is fixed inter-
sects at a tangent the expression for farm profit (2.12) when mit is optimized. This
can be seen in figure 1 where the black lines approach the gray line at a tangent. This
guarantees that the profit function given by (2.12) has continuous first-order deriva-
tives. It also means that farm profit when inertia is non-binding can be constructed
as an envelope function of all the farm profit curves when inertia is binding.
We recognize that over time new technologies are developed and existing
technologies become cheaper to produce and hence the cost of technology qi is un-
likely to be time independent. However for the purpose of this model we will as-
sume that the cost of technology qi only differs between farms as the inclusion of
time dependent technology costs would imply the potential for additional short-run
dynamics (such as farmers delaying adoption because technology will be cheaper in
future periods) which are beyond the scope of this study.8
Figure 1 gives an example of the functional form for pii(mit, nit). We use the
form in (2.12) with the parameters values: ai = −0.33, bi = 40, ci = 150, di = −2,
ei = 50, qi = 2 and mi,t−1 = 0. The gray line gives farms’ profit if they have no
resistance to change. The long- and short-dashed black lines demonstrate farms’
profit functions given bounds on their adoption of technologies (m¯it equals 30 and
10 respectively).
6This assumption has been made for modeling purposes. In reality, we might expect that farmers
could carry out some mitigation without adopting technology. The functional form for farms’ profit
function could be extended to account for this.
7The penalty for adopting too much technology arises not because this makes mitigation more
costly, but because the resources used to finance the purchase of the excess technology could have
been applied elsewhere.
8We also note that as agricultural science and farming practice are improving ai, bi, ci and di may
also be time dependent. However time dependence in these parameters does not contribute to our
model and will be be left for future research.
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Figure 1. Farm’s profit per hectare for levels of inertia
From figure 1 it is clear that farm profit decreases as nutrient emissions de-
creases. Furthermore, for any level of nutrient emissions, farm profit is non-decreasing
as farmers’ inertia weakens (m¯it increases). As farmers’ inertia weakens, farmers are
willing to adopt more technology and this improves the cost effectiveness of some
reductions in nutrients.
Given the functional form of the farm profit functions we can determine a
farmer’s optimal decision as a function of the price of allowances and their inertia.
First, we consider farmers’ decisions under two alternatives: a farmer’s inertia is
binding and a farmer’s inertia is non-binding. Second, we consider how to identify
whether a farmer’s inertia will be binding or not.
Suppose a farmer’s inertia is non-binding. This implies mit < m¯it (for example,
this must occur if m¯it > ei). Then given the price of allowances, pt, a farmer will
choose the technology and nutrient emissions that maximize their objective function
given by (2.9). Let fit(mit, nit) denote the function farmers are trying to maximize,
i.e.,
fit(mit, nit) = pii(mit, nit)− ptnit .
A farmer’s optimal technology can be determined by setting ∂fit
∂mit
= 0.From
(2.12), this implies −2di(ei − nit −mit)− qi = 0. Therefore,
m∗it = ei − nit +
qi
2di
. (2.13)
And a farmer’s optimal nutrient emissions can be determined by setting ∂fit
∂nit
= 0,
which implies 2ainit + bi + qi − pt = 0. Therefore,
n∗it =
pt − bi − qi
2ai
. (2.14)
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Equations (2.13) and (2.14) give a farmer’s optimal choice of technology and nutrient
emissions when their inertia is non-binding. When a farmer’s inertia is non-binding,
their choice of nutrient emissions (and hence their choice of technology) depends
only on the price of nutrient allowances, see (2.14). We note that a farmer’s optimal
technology choice can be decomposed into two parts: the total amount of mitigation
they have carried out (ei − nit) and the ratio of costs to benefits from technology
adoption (qi/2di).
Suppose a farmer’s inertia is binding. This implies mit = m¯it (for example, this
must occur if m¯it = 0). Then given the price of allowances, pt, a farmer will choose
only the nutrient emissions that maximize their objective function given by (2.9).
Note that as the farmer’s inertia is binding, by definition mit = m¯it so a farmer does
not choose their technology.
A farmer’s optimal nutrient emissions can be determined by setting ∂fit
∂nit
= 0.
From (2.12), this implies 2ainit + bi − 2di(ei − nit − m¯it)− pt = 0. Therefore:
n∗it =
pt − bi + 2di(ei − m¯it)
2ai + 2di
. (2.15)
Equation (2.15) gives a farmer’s optimal choice of nutrient emissions when their
inertia is binding. When a farmer’s inertia is binding, their choice of nutrient emis-
sions depends on both the price of nutrient allowances and their inertia.
Whether a farmer’s inertia is binding or non-binding depends on the price
of nutrient allowances. Consider a farmer with inertia m¯it = 15: If the price of al-
lowances is low the farmer can buy many allowances and have high nutrient emis-
sions. Given these emissions, suppose it is optimal for the farmer to use only a few
units of technology, say 5 units. As their inertia is 15, the farmer is willing to use 5
units hence their inertia will be non-binding (mit = 5). Alternatively, if the price of
allowances is high the farmer will buy few allowances and have low nutrient emis-
sions. Given these emissions, suppose it is optimal for the farmer to use more units
of technology, say 20 units. However, as their inertia is 15 the farmer is not willing
to use 20 units of technology and will use only 15 instead, hence their inertia will be
binding (mit = 15).
For a given allowance price, we can determine mˇit, the inertia value at which
a farmer’s inertia is only just binding. This occurs where m¯it is equal to mit given by
(2.13) and nit is given by (2.15). Substituting one equation into the other gives:
mˇit = ei − pt − bi − qi
2ai
+
qi
2di
. (2.16)
So for a given allowance price, farmers with m¯it lower than mˇit will have a bind-
ing inertia constraint and farmers with m¯it higher than mˇit will have a non-binding
inertia constraint.
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From (2.13) and (2.16) we can observe that there are two key reasons why
farmers may not adopt technology. First, farmers’ inertia (m¯it) in period t may be
binding, according to (2.16). So while the farmer may adopt more technology in
a future period, they are unwilling to adopt any more technology in the current
period. Second, the benefits of adopting new technologies may not exceed the cost.
The third term in (2.13) gives the ratio between the cost of technology (qi) and the
improvements in the cost effectiveness of nutrient reductions (−di) that come from
adopting technology. Where the costs of adoption are large, or the benefits small,
farmers will adopt less technology.
Given a farmer’s inertia we can determine the price at which their inertia
will be binding according to (2.16). This enables us to construct a farmer’s demand
for allowances as a function of price. When the price of allowances is less than the
price implied by (2.16), the farmer’s inertia is non-binding and their demand for
allowances is given by (2.14). When the price of allowances is more than the price
implied by (2.16), the farmer’s inertia is binding and their demand for allowances is
given by (2.15). Figure 2 gives an example of farmers’ demand functions that corre-
spond to the example profit functions given in Figure 1.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
m   = 10 m   = 30 m   > 50
Demand for nutrient allowances (kg N / ha)
P
ric
e 
of
 a
llo
w
an
ce
s 
($
)
it it it
p
t
 – b
i
 – q
i
2 a
i
n
it
* =
p
t
 – b
i
 + 2 d
i
(e
i
 – m
it
 )
2 a
i
 + 2 d
i
n
it
* =
Figure 2. The demand for allowances for different levels of inertia
It is clear from figure 2 that farmers’ demand for allowances is decreasing as
the price of allowances rises. Furthermore, we observe that farmers’ demand for
allowances is higher, at any given price, when their inertia is binding. This is to
be expected as, from figure 1, the loss of profit from reducing emissions is much
higher when a farmer’s inertia is binding than when it is non-binding. Proposition
1 establishes this formally.
Proposition 1. Farmers will hold more allowances when their inertia is binding (mit = m¯it)
than when their inertia is non-binding (mit < m¯it) for the same allowances price.
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Proof. For ease of notation we will omit subscripts. Then
p− b− q
2a
≤ p− b+ 2d(e− m¯)
2a+ 2d
m¯ ≤ e− p− b− q
2a
+
q
2d
m¯ ≤ m∗ ,
where m∗ is given by (2.13). This must be true for any binding m¯.
2.5 The inertia function
The form of the inertia function ∆m¯it(·) is independent of the functional form cho-
sen for farms’ profit functions. In designing an inertia function thought needs to
be given to the range of behavior it must be able to exhibit. How long will farm-
ers maintain their current practices before changing? When farmers are willing
to change, how rapidly will they change? Do farmers make many small changes
period-to-period or larger less frequent changes? How prevalent are cascade effects
(where one farmer’s technology adoption triggers adoption by other farmers, which
in turn triggers adoption by yet more farmers)?
It may be helpful when specifying the functional form for farmers’ inertia
function to separate inertia into two components: 1) the decision to change, and 2)
the maximum amount a willing farmer will change this period.
We propose the following functional form for farmers’ inertia function. We
use a linear form for simplicity in the absence of strong preferences for any other
shape.
∆m¯it
(
τi,mi,t−1, pt−1, {mj∈Ii,t−1}
)
=
{
0 if git ≤ δi
git − δi if git > δi
(2.17)
with git a measure of the motivation of (or pressure on) farmer i to adopt new tech-
nologies, expressed as follows:
git = αieiτi + βi
(
m∗i,t−1 −mi,t−τi
)
+ γi
(
max
j
{mj∈Ii,t−1} −mi,t−τi
)
, (2.18)
where
• αi, βi and γi are coefficients (αi, βi, γi ∈ [0, 1]),
• δi is a farmer specific threshold,
• τi is the time since the farmer last adopted new technologies,
• m∗i,t−1 is the technology that would have been optimal last period (as deter-
mined by equations (2.13) and (2.14)),
• Ii is the subset of all farmers (i = 1, ..., I) that farmer i might learn from, in-
cluding themselves (i ∈ Ii),
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• maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1} is the most technology adopted by any farmer that farmer i
might learn from.
In our functional form, a farmer’s inertia depends on three factors: the time
since they last adopted new technologies (τi); the difference between their technol-
ogy and the technology that would have been optimal last period (m∗i,t−1 −mi,t−τi);
and the difference between their technology and the most technology used by any
comparable farmer (maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1} −mi,t−τi).
We use αi to capture how often farmer i replaces or updates their existing
farm technologies and reviews the associated management practices (αi ∈ [0, 1]).
Farmers with low α values will be more likely to have long delays between changes
in technology, perhaps because they are capital constrained. We interpret αi = 1
as indicating that a farmer considers updating all their existing farm technologies
every year, and αi = 0 as indicating that a farmer never considers updating their
existing farm technologies.
We use βi to capture the business focus of the farm (βi ∈ [0, 1]). Farmers with
high β values will be more likely to adopt additional technology when their current
technologies are not optimal. This may be because they are more comfortable inno-
vating. We interpret βi = 1 as indicating that a farmer is always motivated to adopt
technology in order to earn more profit, and βi = 0 as indicating that a farmer is
never motivated to adopt technology in order to earn more profit.
We use γi to capture a farmer’s willingness and ability to learn from other
farmers (γi ∈ [0, 1]). Farmers with high γ values will be more likely to adopt tech-
nology when other farmers have already done so. This may be because they are
receptive to being social influenced or because they are resistant to implementing
new technologies on their own farm until they have observed these being imple-
mented on other farms. We interpret γi = 1 as indicating that a farmer is continually
seeking to learn from their networks, and γi = 0 as indicating that a farmer never
seeks to learn from their networks.
From (2.18) we can see that the minimum value of git is zero. While the max-
imum value of git is theoretically τiei +m∗i,t−1 + maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1},9 in practice we may
treat any value of git greater than ei+δi as equal to ei+δi. This is because git ≥ ei+δi
implies that a farmer is willing to adopt technology that would cost effectively mit-
igate the nutrient emissions from their entire farm.
Recall that ei gives the emissions of farm i prior to regulation. We are inter-
9The minimum value of git occurs when αi = 0, βi(m∗i,t−1−mi,t−τi) = 0 and γi(maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1}−
mi,t−τi) = 0. The maximum value of git occurs when αi, βi, γi = 1, and mi,t−τi = 0.
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ested in git/ei: the ratio of a farmer’s motivation to adopt technology against their
farm’s baseline nutrient emissions. We can interpret this as the proportion of the
farm’s baseline emissions that farmer i is considering mitigating using new technol-
ogy in period t. We treat git/ei ≥ 1 as git/ei = 1: the farmer is considering adopting
new technology in order to mitigate all their emissions cost effectively.
In (2.17), we use δi to capture overall resistance to change (δi ≥ 0). As δi
acts as a threshold for git, we would expect it to take similar values to git. Hence
we anticipate that in practice δi will be less than or equal to ei. Farmers with high
δ values will be less likely to adopt new technologies, this may be because they
have low environmental concern or prefer traditional methods of farming. We can
interpret δi/ei as the proportion of a farm’s initial emissions which the farmer is
especially resistant to changing.
It should be noted that the αi and δi parameters do not affect farmers’ inertia
independently of each other. They can be used together to model 1) continuous or
2) periodic technology adoption.
1. Continuous technology adoption can occur if αiei > δi: so when τ = 1, git will
be greater than δi and the farmer will adopt new technology.
For example: Suppose farmer iwill always be willing to adopt k1 units of tech-
nology every period (k1 ≥ 0). This can be reflected in the model by choosing
αiei − δi = k1.10
2. Periodic technology adoption can occur if αiei < δi: so when τ = 1, git is not
greater than δi and the farmer will not adopt new technology, but for some
τ > 1, git will be greater than δi and the farmer will adopt new technology.
For example: Suppose farmer i is willing to adopt k2 units of technology every
k3 periods (k2 ≥ 0 and k3 ∈ N). This can be reflected in the model by choosing
δi large, and k3αiei = δi + k2.
2.6 Two example classifications
The inertia function given in the previous section can reflect the farmer attitudes
towards farming and change as classified by Connor et al. (2008) and Ward et al.
(2008). From tables 1 and 2, we associate business focus and innovation with farm-
ers’ β values, willingness to learn and social responsiveness with farmers’ γ values,
and environmental concern with farmers’ δ values. The farmers who are capital con-
strained will have both very low α values and also lower β values, as their capital
10As there are infinitely many combinations of αi and δi that satisfy αiei − δi = k1 we prefer the
combination where δi = 0 and αiei = k1.
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constraints reduce their ability to replace existing technology and to innovate. This
suggests parameter values as follows:
Description α value β value γ value δ value
Business oriented 52% + -
Innovative 22% ++ - -
Traditionalists 13% - - - ++
Table 3. Inertia coefficients for farmers classified by Connor et al. (2008)
Description α value β value γ value δ value
Socially influenced 52% - ++ +
Innovative 25% + - +
Lifestyle 10% - - - - -
Capital Constrained 13% - - - ++ - -
Table 4. Inertia coefficients for farmers classified by Ward et al. (2008)
Tables 3 and 4 indicate relative parameter values for farmers’ inertia function.
Cells containing + (++) indicate (very) high parameter values, and cells containing
- (- -) indicate (very) low parameter values. Blank cells indicate that the parameter
takes moderate values.
2.7 Expected behavior
Consider a catchment containing farmers who differ only in the coefficients of their
inertia functions (α, β and γ). Suppose there were to be a step decrease in the total
permitted level of nutrient emissions. This could be driven by the introduction of a
nutrient trading scheme or a decrease in the supply of emission allowances within
an established scheme. Equilibrium, with respect to this permitted level of emis-
sions, is reached when all farmers have finished adopting new technologies and no
further adoption will take place. We anticipate that the values of the α, β and γ pa-
rameters can be set such that the inertia model captures the following response by
farmers:
1. Initial inertia is high. There is minimal adoption of new technologies, most
farms respond by trying to manage within their current technology and prac-
tices.
2. The price of allowances will rise and be much higher than its long run value.
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3. Some farmers’ inertia will weaken, motivating them to introduce new tech-
nologies. These farmers will be the ones most motivated by profit (having
high βi(mi,t−1∗ −mi,t−1) values).
4. The price of allowances will decrease as those farmers who adopted technol-
ogy now demand fewer allowances at each price.
5. Some farmers will learn from those farmers who have already adopted new
technology, motivating them to also adopt new technologies. These farmers
will be the ones motivated by their social and professional networks (having
high γi
(
maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1} −mi,t−1
)
values). This will further lower the price of
allowances.
6. Stages three to five will repeat as farmers acquire the technology they will use
in equilibrium.
7. Some farmers may have adopted more technology that is optimal in equilib-
rium. These farmers will decrease the use of their excess technologies (and
may increase emissions) as the price of allowances declines.
8. As farmers approach their equilibrium decisions they will adopt new tech-
nologies less frequently and in smaller amounts (driven by the αiτi component
of git).
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Chapter 3
Two Farmer Case: Analytic Model
Performance
We consider the performance of the inertia model when there are only two farmers.
This enables us to isolate and identify the effects of different parameters and interac-
tions within the model. Recall that mit is the technology used by farmer i in period
t, and that m¯it is the maximum technology farmer i is willing to use in period t.
When considering scenarios with only two farmers we may define three stages
depending on farmers’ inertias:
1. Both farmers’ inertias are binding (m¯1t = m1t and m¯2t = m2t), so farmers can-
not yet adopt the amount of technology that would be ideal in equilibrium.
2. One farmer’s inertia is non-binding, and the other farmer’s inertia is binding
(m¯1t > m1t and m¯2t = m2t). So the first farmer is willing to adopt at least
the amount of technology that will be optimal in equilibrium (we calculate the
minimum m¯it for this farmer in section 3.2), while the second farmer cannot
yet adopt the amount of technology that would be ideal in equilibrium.
3. Both farmers’ inertias are non-binding (m¯1t > m1t and m¯2t > m2t), so both
farmers are willing to adopt the amount of technology that is ideal in equilib-
rium.
These stages partition the time since the introduction of nutrient regulation. We will
always label our farmers so that m¯1t ≥ m¯2t and m1t ≥ m2t.
During stage one, both farmers’ technology adoption is limited by their iner-
tia. As each farmer’s inertia weakens they will both adopt more technology. Even-
tually, one farmer’s inertia will weaken sufficiently that it becomes non-binding. At
this point stage one ends and stage two begins (unless both farmers’ inertias become
non-binding in the same period, in this case stage three begins).
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During stage two, only one farmer’s technology adoption is limited by their
inertia. As this farmer’s inertia weakens they will adopt more technology. Eventu-
ally their inertia will weaken sufficiently that it becomes non-binding. At this point
stage two ends and stage three begins. Through stage two, the other farmer uses the
optimal level of technology (mit = m∗it) as given by (2.13).
Stage three is the ideal long run equilibrium for both farmers. Neither farmer’s
inertia is binding and both farmers are willing to adopt the optimal level of technol-
ogy. As a result their total combined profits are maximized. The outcomes under
stage three are identical to the outcomes under the static economic model (given by
equations (2.4) - (2.5)). If both farmers have identical profit functions (as we consider
in this chapter) then both farmers will hold half the nutrient allowances each.
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Figure 3. Farmers technology adoption over time
Note that, farmers’ δi values can prevent stage one transitioning to stage two
and stage two transitioning to stage three. Where this occurs a pair of farmers may
never reach stage three, instead attaining an alternative equilibrium in stage two or
one. Figure 3 gives an example of farmers reaching equilibrium in each of the stages.
For each panel in figure 3 farmers have reached equilibrium by period 40.1
1Figure 3 has been generated by solving a numerical version of the two farmer model when α1 =
0.006, β1 = 0.1, γ1 = 0.02, α2 = 0, β2 = 0.05, and γ2 = 0.1. The δi values are 0, 0.2 and 0.8 for both
farmers in the first, second and third panels respectively. The parameter values for both farms’ profit
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Panel 1 of figure 3 illustrates the case where equilibrium is reached in stage
three. This is the ideal outcome as both farmers adopt their optimal level of tech-
nology (m∗it) in the long run. Equilibrium is reached in stage three when first one
farmer’s and then the other farmer’s inertia becomes non-binding. This must oc-
cur where δ1, δ2 = 0 (as in our example) but may also occur when δ1 and δ2 take
small values. So, while both farmers may have some resistance to change (δi) this is
overcome by their motivation to change (git).
Panel 2 of figure 3 illustrates the case where equilibrium is reached in stage
two. This occurs where the first farmers’ inertia becomes non-binding but the sec-
ond farmers’ inertia will always be binding. So, while both farmers are willing to
make changes on their farms, for the second farmer their motivation to change (g2t)
can not overcome their resistance to change (δ2) in the long run. This means that,
the second farmer’s inertia is binding (m2t = m¯2t) and their inertia will not weaken
(∆m¯2t = 0).
Panel 3 of figure 3 illustrates the case where equilibrium is reached in stage
one. This occurs where neither farmers’ inertia ever becomes non-binding. So, while
both farmers are willing to make some changes on their farms, their motivation to
change (git) can not overcome their resistance to change (δi) in the long run.
3.1 Prices and allowance holdings
In this section we determine the market price of allowances and farmers’ allowance
holdings, for each stage, as functions of the nutrient cap (N¯t) and farmers’ inertia
(m¯it). These results are important for considering different aspects of the model in
sections 3.2 to 3.4. In order to focus on the effects of inertia, we will assume farmers
have identical profit functions (a, b, c, d and e values) and initial technology (mt−1),
and only differ in their inertia (m¯it). While farms may have significantly different
profit functions and initial technology in practice, these assumptions enable us to
consider two representative farms. For ease of notation we suppress the t subscripts.
Stage 1. Both farmers’ inertias are binding (m¯1 = m1 and m¯2 = m2).
The presence of a binding nutrient cap implies N¯ = n1 +n2. As both farmers’
inertias are binding their demand for allowances is given by (2.15). It follows that
the price of allowances will be such that:
N¯ = n1 + n2 =
p− b+ 2d(e− m¯1)
2a+ 2d
+
p− b+ 2d(e− m¯2)
2a+ 2d
.
functions are ai = −0.3347, bi = 41.46, ci = 92.22, di = −0.5, ei = 50 and qi = 0.
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Rearranging with respect to p gives:
p = aN¯ + b+ q − d(2e− N¯ − m¯1 − m¯2 + q
d
) . (3.1)
Substituting (3.1) into farmers’ demand for allowances (2.15) gives the nutrient emis-
sions and allowance holdings for farmers 1 and 2 as follows:
n1 =
N¯
2
− d
2a+ 2d
(m¯1 − m¯2) ,
n2 =
N¯
2
+
d
2a+ 2d
(m¯1 − m¯2) .
(3.2)
Stage 2. Only one farmer’s inertia is binding (m¯1 > m1 and m¯2 = m2).
The presence of a binding cap implies N¯ = n1 + n2. Farmers demand for
allowances is given by (2.14) and (2.15), when their inertia is non-binding and bind-
ing, respectively. It follows that the price of allowances will be such that:
N¯ = n1 + n2 =
p− b− q
2a
+
p− b+ 2d(e− m¯2)
2a+ 2d
.
Rearranging with respect to p gives:
p = aN¯ + b+ q − ad
2a+ d
(2e− N¯ − 2m¯2 + q
d
) . (3.3)
Substituting (3.3) into farmers’ demand for allowances (2.14) and (2.15) gives the
nutrient emissions and allowance holdings for farmers 1 and 2 as follows:
n1 =
N¯
2
− d
2a+ d
(e− m¯2 − N¯/2 + q
2d
) ,
n2 =
N¯
2
+
d
2a+ d
(e− m¯2 − N¯/2 + q
2d
) .
(3.4)
Stage 3. Neither farmers’ inertias are binding (m¯1 > m1 and m¯2 > m2).
The presence of a binding nutrient cap implies N¯ = n1 +n2. As both farmers’
inertias are non-binding their demand for allowances is given by (2.14). It follows
that the price of allowances will be such that:
N¯ = n1 + n2 =
p− b− q
2a
+
p− b− q
2a
.
Rearranging with respect to p gives:
p = aN¯ + b+ q . (3.5)
Substituting (3.5) into farmers’ demand for allowances (2.14) gives the nutrient emis-
sions and allowance holdings for farmers 1 and 2 as follows:
n1 = n2 =
N¯
2
. (3.6)
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We observe that both the market price (p) and farmers’ nutrient emissions and
allowance holdings (ni) can be expressed as their ideal long run (stage three) value
plus some measure of distance from this ideal value. As farmers’ inertia weakens
these distances will decrease and the outcomes under the inertia model will ap-
proach the outcomes under the static economic model (given by equations (2.4) -
(2.5)).
3.2 Transitions between stages
We have identified three stages that occur in the two farmer model. In this section,
we are concerned with transitions between these stages. We first show that the price
of allowances decreases as we move from stage one through to stage three, and go
on to identify when transitions between stages occur as functions of m¯1t and m¯2t.
Proposition 2. The prices of nutrient allowances in stage two will never exceed the prices
in stage one (pstage 1 ≥ pstage 2), and the prices in stage three will never exceed the prices in
stage two (pstage 2 ≥ pstage 3).
Proof. It is clear from (3.1), (3.3) and (3.5) that the price of nutrient allowances is
non-increasing during any given stage (for a fixed nutrient cap). We therefore only
need to consider the price of allowances where stage one ends and stage two begin,
and also where stage two ends and stage three begins. We will consider each pair of
stages in turn.
Stage 1 and stage 2. The change in price when the first farmer’s inertia becomes non-
binding.
pstage 1 − pstage 2 = −d(2e− N¯ − m¯1 − m¯2 + q
d
) +
ad
2a+ d
(2e− N¯ − 2m¯2 + q
d
)
> −d(2e− N¯ − 2m¯2 + q
d
) +
ad
2a+ d
(2e− N¯ − 2m¯2 + q
d
)
= d
(
2e− N¯ − 2m¯2 + q
d
)( a
2a+ d
− 1
)
,
which must be non-negative as a, d < 0, a
2a+d
< 1 and m¯2 ≤ e− N¯/2 + q/2d.
Stage 2 and stage 3. The change in price when the second farmer’s inertia becomes non-
binding.
pstage 2 − pstage 3 = aN¯ + b− ad
2a+ d
(2e− N¯ − 2m¯2) + a+ d
2a+ d
q − aN¯ − b− q
= − ad
2a+ d
(2e− N¯ − 2m¯2 + q
d
) ,
which must be non-negative as a, d < 0 and m¯2 ≤ e− N¯/2 + q/2d.
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Hence, the price of allowances is non-increasing as we move from stage one to stage
two, and as we move from stage two to stage three.
This supports our description of the expected behavior of the model in sec-
tion 2.7. It also suggests that a higher price of allowances in the short run may be
necessary to motivate farmers to adopt new technologies.
Transitions between stages in a two farmer system can be defined by farmers’
inertia constraints (a transition can be identified by m¯i,t−1 = mi,t−1 and m¯it > mit for
any farmer i). We next identify when these transitions will occur as functions of m¯1t
and m¯2t.
From proposition 2 we have shown that the price of nutrient allowances is
non-increasing (for any given m¯it) as we move from stage one through to stage three.
It follows that transitions between stages occur at the m¯it such that the price differ-
ence between the two stages in question is zero.2
Hence, stage one transitions to stage two when m¯1t and m¯2t are such that
pstage 1 − pstage 2 ≤ 0. This occurs when:
m¯1t ≥ m¯2t + a+ d
2a+ d
(
2e− N¯ − 2m¯2t + q/d
)
. (3.7)
We will denote the period in which stage one transitions to stage two, i.e., the
first period in which (3.7) is true, as t2. Farmers’ technology adoption decisions in
this period can be denoted mi,t2 . It is straightforward to show that the technology
used by the first farmer immediately after their inertia becomes non-binding (m1,t2)
is equal to the right hand-side of (3.7).
Furthermore, stage two transitions to stage three when m¯2t is such that pstage 2−
pstage 3 ≤ 0. This occurs when:
m¯2t ≥ e− N¯
2
+
q
2d
.
This result is as expected as the right hand-side of the above equation is the ideal
equilibrium technology adoption of farmer 2 (as given by (2.13) and (3.6)). We will
denote the period in which stage two transitions to stage three as t3.
3.3 Profitability
We expect that as farmers’ inertias weaken and they adopt more technology, that
they will require fewer nutrient allowances and will earn higher profits. In this sec-
2This defines the boundary at which transitions between stages occur. In practice a transition
between stages must have occurred if the m¯it are such that the price difference between the two
stages in question is zero or negative.
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tion we show that the functional forms we have chosen for our model are consistent
with these expectations. Our proofs draw on the prices of allowances and farmers’
allowances holdings specified in section 3.1. For ease of notation we suppress the t
subscripts. Where stage three is trivial we omit it from the following proofs.
Proposition 3. Given two farmers with identical profit functions, the farmer who is more
willing to adopt technology will hold fewer nutrient allowances (m¯1 ≥ m¯2 implies n1 ≤ n2).
Proof. We will consider each of the stages in turn.
Stage 1. Both farmers’ inertias are binding (m¯1 = m1 and m¯2 = m2).
n1 − n2 =
(N¯
2
− d
2a+ 2d
(m¯1 − m¯2)
)
−
(N¯
2
+
d
2a+ 2d
(m¯1 − m¯2)
)
= − 2d
2a+ 2d
(m¯1 − m¯2) ,
which must be non-positive as a, d < 0 and m¯1 ≥ m¯2. Therefore n1 ≤ n2.
Stage 2. Only one farmer’s inertia is binding (m¯1 > m1 and m¯2 = m2).
n1 − n2 =
(N¯
2
− d
2a+ d
(e− m¯2 − N¯
2
+
q
2d
)
)
−
(N¯
2
+
d
2a+ d
(e− m¯2 − N¯
2
+
q
2d
)
)
= − 2d
2a+ d
(e− m¯2 − N¯/2 + q
2d
) ,
which must be non-positive as a, d < 0 and m¯2 < e− N¯/2 + q/2d.
Hence, for two farmers with identical profit functions m¯1 ≥ m¯2 implies n1 ≤ n2.
It follows from proposition 3 that farmers’ demand for nutrient allowances
declines as they adopt technology. This is consistent with the result from proposition
2, the price of allowances declines as farmers adopt technology. So, we observe that
as the demand for allowances declines, the price of allowances also declines (note
that the supply of allowances is constant and equal to the nutrient cap).
Proposition 4. Given two farmers with identical profit functions, the farmer who is more
willing to adopt technology will be more profitable (m¯1 ≥ m¯2 implies f1 ≥ f2).
Proof. We will consider each of the stages in turn.
Stage 1. Both farmers’ inertias are binding (m¯1 = m1 and m¯2 = m2).
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As in section 2.4, we will use fit(mit, nit) to denote the profit from farm i net
of the value of allowances: fit(mit, nit) = pii(mit, nit)− ptnit.
f1 − f2 = (a+ d)(n12 − n22) + (b− p− 2de)(n1 − n2) + 2d(n1m¯1 − n2m¯2)
+ d(m¯21 − m¯22)− 2de(m¯1 − m¯2)− q(m¯1 − m¯2)
=
−2ad
a+ d
(m¯1 − m¯2)
(
e− p− b− q
2a
− m¯1 + m¯2
2
+
q
2d
)
,
given n1 and n2 as defined in (3.2). f1−f2 must be non-negative as a, d < 0, m¯1 ≥ m¯2,
and the last term can be show to be positive from proposition 1 and (2.16).
Stage 2. Only one farmer’s inertia is binding (m¯1 > m1 and m¯2 = m2).
f1 − f2 = a(n12 − n22) + (b− p)(n1 − n2)− d(e− n2 − m¯2)2
− q(e− n1 − m¯2 + q
2d
) +
q2
4d
=
−4ad(a+ d)
(2a+ d)2
(e− N¯/2− m¯2 + q
2d
)2 ,
given n1 and n2 as defined in (3.4). This must be positive as all terms are positive.
Hence, for two farmers with identical profit functions m¯1 ≥ m¯2 implies f1 ≥ f2.
This result is consistent with our expectations, farmers who adopt more tech-
nology (and hence carry out more mitigation cost effectively) will be more prof-
itable. In addition, this result implies that farmers always have a profit based incen-
tive to adopt technology whenever their inertia is binding.
Proposition 5. Given two farmers with identical profit functions, if m¯j is binding then fi
(i = 1, 2) is increasing in m¯j for any j = 1, 2. So, increasing m¯j will increase the profits of
both farmers net of the value of allowances.
Proof. From proposition 4 we have effectively shown that ∂fi
∂m¯j
> 0 whenever i = j.
We therefore only need to show that the relationship holds for i 6= j.
Stage 1. Both farmers’ inertias are binding (m¯1 = m1 and m¯2 = m2).
∂fi
∂m¯j
= 2ani
∂ni
∂m¯j
+ b
∂ni
∂m¯j
+ 2d(e− ni − m¯i)(− ∂ni
∂m¯j
)− ∂p
∂m¯j
ni − p ∂ni
∂m¯j
=
2ad
2a+ 2d
ni +
bd
2a+ 2d
− 2d
2
2a+ 2d
(e− ni − m¯i)− dni − pd
2a+ 2d
=
d
2a+ 2d
[
(b− p)− 2d(e− m¯i)
]
,
where the third line follows from the second as ∂ni
∂m¯j
= d
2a+2d
and ∂p
∂m¯j
= d. This
implies ∂fi
∂m¯j
must be greater than zero as a, d < 0, b > p, and e > m¯i.
3.4. MITIGATION DECISIONS FOR TWO FARMERS 37
Stage 2. Only one farmer’s inertia is binding (m¯1 > m1 and m¯2 = m2).
In this stage we ignore m¯1 as it is non-binding and focus on m¯2.
∂f1
∂m¯2
= 2an1
∂n1
∂m¯2
+ b
∂n1
∂m¯2
q
∂n1
∂m¯2
− ∂p
∂m¯2
n1 − p ∂n1
∂m¯2
=
2ad
2a+ d
n1 +
bd
2a+ d
+
qd
2a+ d
− 2ad
2a+ d
n1 − pd
2a+ d
=
d
2a+ d
(
b+ q − p) ,
where the third lines follows from the second as ∂n1
∂m¯2
= d
2a+d
and ∂p
∂m¯2
= 2ad
2a+d
. This
implies ∂f1
∂m¯2
must be greater than zero as a, d < 0, and b+ q > p.
Hence, we have shown in the two farmer case that if m¯j is binding, profit for
all farmers is increasing in m¯j .
These results are important as they suggest that there are synergy effects.
More technology adopted by one farmer has a positive spill over effect to other
farmers: As a farmer adopts more technology their profit increases even while their
demand for allowances decreases. This lowers the price of allowances and frees up
allowances for other farmers, increasing their profits as well. The presence of these
synergy effects is a potential justification for a regulator to provide incentives for
farmers to adopt additional technologies or practices. While a single farmer bears
the cost of adopting technology, many farmers may benefit from the technology
adoption.
3.4 Mitigation decisions for two farmers
In this section we derive analytic results for farmers’ technology adoption over time
in several special cases of the two farmer model. For our special cases, farmers only
differ in their inertia coefficients, so both farmers have identical profit functions. To
isolate the different determinants of farmers’ technology adoption we require that
only one of αi, βi and γi may be non-zero for each farmer, and that δi = 0 for both
farmers.3 The special cases are as follows:
• Special Case 1. Both farmers only adopt new technologies as they update their
existing farm technologies. Hence α1 and α2 are non-zero.
3We do not consider all possible combinations of αi, βi and γi in our special cases. We omit the
special case when α1 and β2 (or β1 and α2) are non-zero, as the outcomes in this special case depend
on the relative magnitudes of the farmers’ α and β values. We omit the special case when γ1 and γ2
are non-zero. In this special case neither farmer will adopt technology, because both farmers only
adopt technology in response to observing adoption by the other farmer.
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• Special Case 2. Both farmers only adopt new technology when their existing
technologies are not optimal, and both farmers always adopt the same tech-
nology. Hence β1 and β2 are non-zero and β1 = β2.
• Special Case 3. Both farmers only adopt new technology when their existing
technologies are not optimal, and one farmer tends to adopt more technology
than the other farmer. Hence β1 and β2 are non-zero and β1 > β2.
• Special Case 4. One farmer only adopts new technology as they update their
existing farm technologies, while the other farmer only adopts new technology
in response to observing adoption by the first farmer. Hence α1 and γ2 are non-
zero.
• Special Case 5. One farmer only adopts new technology when their existing
technologies are not optimal, while the other farmer only adopts new technol-
ogy in response to observing adoption by the first farmer. Hence β1 and γ2 are
non-zero.
For all the special cases, we will consider the introduction of nutrient regulation, at
t = 1, with a constant cap (N¯ ). In the absence of regulation at t = 0, we will assume
p0 = 0, m¯i0 = 0, and ni0 = ei for all i.
Note that for all five special cases, the farmer who initially adopts the most
technology (in periods 1 or 2) will never have less technology than the other farmer.
Hence, without loss of generality we label our farmers 1 and 2, such that m¯1t ≥ m¯2t
and m1t ≥ m2t for all t.
Analytic solutions to these special cases require us to consider farmers’ tech-
nology adoption under each of the three stages. As all five special cases have the
same result for stage three, we give it here rather than repeating it with each solu-
tion below:
In stage three neither farmer’s inertia is binding (m¯1t > m1t and m¯2t > m2t),
so both farmers are willing to adopt the amount of technology that is optimal in
equilibrium. Let period t3 be the first period in which stage three occurs. It follows
from (2.13) and (3.6) that ∀t ≥ t3 : m1t = m2t = e− N¯/2 + q/2d.
We next consider each of the special cases in turn. Following the analytic
results of each special case, we provide figures to demonstrate farmers’ technology
adoption. Figures 4 to 8 are drawn from numerical solutions to the inertia model in
the two-farmer case, and are consistent with the analytic solutions.4
4The numerical solutions for figures 4 to 8 use the same a, b, c, d, e and q values as are used for
figure 3.
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Special Case 1. Both farmers only adopt new technologies as they update their existing
farm technologies (α1 and α2 are non-zero).
Assume τi = 0 for both farmers. As δi = 0, farmer i will be willing to adopt
αie additional technology each period. If we require α1 > α2 then m¯1t ≥ m¯2t for all
t. We will consider each stage in turn.
Stage 1. Both farmers’ inertias are binding (m¯1 = m1 and m¯2 = m2).
As both m¯1t and m¯2t are binding, it follows that m1t = m¯1t and m2t = m¯2t.
m1t = m1,t−1 + α1e
= α1et
m2t = m2,t−1 + α2e
= α2et
Stage 2. Only one farmer’s inertia is binding (m¯1 > m1 and m¯2 = m2).
As only m¯2t is binding and m¯1t is non-binding, it follows that m2t = m¯2t and
m1t = e− n1t + q/2d.
m2t = α2et
m1t = e− N¯/2 + q
2d
+
d
2a+ d
(e− N¯
2
−m2t + q
2d
)
= e− N¯/2 + q
2d
+
d
2a+ d
(e− N¯
2
− α2et+ q
2d
)
Figure 4 illustrates farmers’ technology adoption (mit) over time in special
case 1. This figure has been drawn with α1e = 2 and α2e = 1.
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Figure 4. Farmers’ technology adoption over time (special case 1)
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It is clear from special case 1 that the length of stage one decreases as both
α1 and α2 increase, and that the length of stage two decreases as α2 increases. This
is as expected: the faster farmers adopt new technology the sooner they will reach
equilibrium.
It is important to note that the model allows for farmer 1 to adopt more tech-
nology in the short run (before equilibrium is reached) than is optimal in the long
run. This behavior will be partly due to the assumption that decision makers are
short-sighted. Where technology adoption is costly, forward looking decision mak-
ers may avoid adopting technology that they will not need in the long run. So tech-
nology use by farmer 1 from year 13 to year 20 is likely to be less than suggested
by figure 4. However, we may still expect farmer 1 to adopt more technology in the
short run than is optimal in the long run: If farmer 2 is slow to adopt technology,
then the benefits to farmer 1 from temporarily adopting additional technology may
exceeds the costs.
Special Case 2. Both farmers only adopt new technology when their existing technologies
are not optimal, and both farmers always adopt the same technology (β1 and β2 are non-zero,
and β1 = β2).
As the β terms are identical, m1t = m2t and m¯1t = m¯2t for all t. It follows that
stage one will tend to stage three directly and stage two will not occur.
Stage 1. Both farmers’ inertias are binding (m¯1 = m1 and m¯2 = m2).
In this stage, as we have m1t = m¯1t = m¯2t = m2t we suppress the i subscripts.
mt = mt−1 + β
(
e− pt−1 − b
2a
+
q
2d
−mt−1
)
=
(
1− β − βd
a
)
mt−1 + β
(
1 +
d
a
)(
e− N¯/2 + q
2d
)
=
(
e− N¯/2 + q
2d
)(
1− (1− β − βd
a
)t−1
)
Figure 5 illustrates farmers’ technology adoption (mit) over time in special
case 2. This figure has been drawn with β1 = β2 = 0.1. Due to the initial conditions
and the one-period lag in the inertia function, farmers’ technology adoption starts
from zero in period one and is non-zero from period two onwards.
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Figure 5. Farmers’ technology adoption over time (special case 2)
It is clear from special case 2 that farmers’ motivation to adopt technology
when their existing technologies are not optimal declines exponentially with their
adoption of new technology. This means that business oriented farmers’ adopt the
majority of their technology in the years immediately following the introduction of
regulation, and the remainder of their technology much more slowly.
We note that farmers’ adoption of technology is slow when β(1+d/a) is close
to 0 and faster as β(1+d/a) approaches 1. Parameter choices that result in β(1+d/a)
greater than 1 suggest that farmers are willing to adopt their equilibrium amount of
technology as soon as they realize it is profitable (adjustment is instantaneous).
Special Case 3. Both farmers only adopt new technology when their existing technologies
are not optimal, and one farmer tends to adopt more technology than the other farmer (β1
and β2 are non-zero, and β1 > β2).
If we require β1 > β2 then m¯1t ≥ m¯2t for all t. We will consider each stage in
turn.
Stage 1. Both farmers’ inertias are binding (m¯1 = m1 and m¯2 = m2).
As both m¯1t and m¯2t are binding, if follows that m1t = m¯1t and m2t = m¯2t.
m1t = m1,t−1 + β1
(
e− pt−1 − b− q
2a
+
q
2d
−m1,t−1
)
=
(
1− β1 − β1d
2a
)
m1,t−1 − β1d
2a
m2,t−1 + β1
(
1 +
d
a
)(
e− N¯/2 + q
2d
)
,
m2t = m2,t−1 + β2
(
e− pt−1 − b− q
2a
+
q
2d
−m2,t−1
)
=
(
1− β2 − β2d
2a
)
m2,t−1 − β2d
2a
m1,t−1 + β2
(
1 +
d
a
)(
e− N¯/2 + q
2d
)
.
This relationship defines a system of first order linear difference equations. This
system can be solved according to the methodology given in appendix C.
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We can construct the following upper bound for technology adoption, if we
ignore the β1d
2a
m2,t−1 and β2d2a m1,t−1 terms in the expressions for m1t and m2t respec-
tively:
mit =
(
e− N¯/2 + q
2d
)(
1− (1− βi − βid
2a
)t−1
)
,
where β1d
2a
m2,t−1 and β2d2a m1,t−1 are small, this upper bound will give a good approx-
imation to the true value. We note that this upper bound is very similar to the
solution in special case 2. This is to be expected as adoption by farmer i in both the
upper bound and special case 2 is driven by the farmer’s βi value.
Stage 2. Only one farmer’s inertia is binding (m¯1 > m1 and m¯2 = m2).
As m¯2t is binding and m¯1t is non-binding, if follows that m2t = m¯2t and m1t =
e− n1t + q/2d.
m2t = m2,t−1 + β2
(
e− pt−1 − b− q
2a
+
q
2d
−m2,t−1
)
=
(
1− β2 − β2d
2a+ d
)
m2,t−1 + β2
(
1 +
d
2a+ d
)(
e− N¯/2 + q
2d
)
=
(
e− N¯/2 + q
2d
)(
1− (1− β2 − β2d
2a+ d
)t−t2
)
+m2,t2(1− β2 −
β2d
2a+ d
)t−t2 ,
m1t = e− N¯/2 + q
2d
+
d
2a+ d
(e− N¯/2 + q
2d
−m2t)
= (e− N¯/2 + q
2d
) +
d
2a+ d
(e− N¯/2 + q
2d
−m2,t2)(1− β2 −
β2d
2a+ d
)t−t2 ,
where mi,t2 denotes technology adoption by farmer i at the start of stage two.
Figure 6 illustrates farmers’ technology adoption (mit) over time in special
case 3. This figure has been drawn with β1 = 0.25 and β2 = 0.13.
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Figure 6. Farmers’ technology adoption over time (special case 3)
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It is clear from special case 3 that, during stage two, both m1t and m2t con-
verge exponentially from their values at the start of stage two (m1,t2 and m2,t2) to-
wards their long run values (e − N¯/2 + q/2d). We note that convergence is slower
when β(1− d
2a+d
) is close to 0 and is instant if β(1− d
2a+d
) is greater than 1. Although
m1t is decreasing during stage two, we observe that m2t is increasing at a faster rate,
so the total adoption of technology is increasing.
We also note that the length of stage two depends solely on on the technology
adoption of the second farmer (in particular β2). As β2 increases the length of stage
two will decrease and the difference between farmers’ technology adoption paths
will likewise decrease.
Special Case 4. One farmer only adopts new technology as they update their existing farm
technologies, while the other farmer only adopts new technology in response to observing
adoption by the first farmer (α1 and γ2 are non-zero).
Assume τ1 = 0. As δ1 = 0, farmer 1 will be willing to adopt α1e additional
technology each period. By construction, farmer 2 will only ever carry out addi-
tional mitigation in response to the mitigation currently being carried out by farmer
1, hence m¯1t ≥ m¯2t. We will consider each stage in turn.
Stage 1. Both farmers’ inertias are binding (m¯1 = m1 and m¯2 = m2).
As both m¯1t and m¯2t are binding, we have m1t = m¯1t and m2t = m¯2t.
m1t = m1,t−1 + α1e
= α1et ,
m2t = m2,t−1 + γ2(m1,t−1 −m2,t−1)
= (1− γ2)m2,t−1 + γ2α1e(t− 1)
= α1e(t− 1)− α1e(1− γ2)
γ2
(
1− (1− γ2)t−1
)
.
We observe that the result form2t can be decomposed into a one-period lag of
m1t and a decay factor. As γ2 tends towards 1, m2t tends to m1,t−1, and hence farmer
2 mimics farmer 1 with a one-period lag.
Stage 2. Only one farmer’s inertia is binding (m¯1 > m1 and m¯2 = m2).
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As m¯2t is binding and m¯1t is non-binding, it follows that m2t = m¯2t and m1t =
e− n1t + q/2d.
m2t = m2,t−1 + γ2
(
m1,t−1 −m2,t−1
)
=
(
1− γ2 − γ2d
2a+ d
)
m2,t−1 + γ2
(
1 +
d
2a+ d
)(
e− N¯/2 + q
2d
)
=
(
e− N¯/2 + q
2d
)(
1− (1− γ2 − γ2d
2a+ d
)t−t2
)
+m2,t2(1− γ2 −
γ2d
2a+ d
)t−t2 ,
m1t = e− N¯/2 + q
2d
+
d
2a+ d
(e− N¯/2 + q
2d
−m2t)
= (e− N¯/2 + q
2d
) +
d
2a+ d
(e− N¯/2 + q
2d
−m2,t2)(1− γ2 −
γ2d
2a+ d
)t−t2 .
We observe identical behavior in stage two as we observed in stage two of
special case 3 (β1 and β2 non-zero, and β1 > β2), but with β2 terms replaced by
γ2 terms. This makes it clear that both βi and γi cause m1t and m2t to converge
exponentially from their values at the start of stage two (m1,t2 and m2,t2) towards
their long run values (e− N¯/2 + q/2d).
Figure 7 illustrates farmers’ technology adoption (mit) over time in special
case 4. This figure has been drawn with α1e = 2 and γ2 = 0.2.
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Figure 7. Farmers’ technology adoption over time (special case 4)
It is clear from special case 4 that α1 is the key parameter that determines the
length of stage one, while γ2 is the key parameter that determines the length of stage
two. Hence, as the first farmer revises more of their farm each year and the second
farmer mimics the first more closely both farmers will reach equilibrium adoption
sooner.
Special Case 5. One farmer only adopts new technology when their existing technologies
are not optimal, while the other farmer only adopts new technology in response to observing
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adoption by the first farmer (β1 and γ2 are non-zero).
By construction, farmer 2 will only adopt technology in response to the tech-
nology currently used by farmer 1, hence m¯1t ≥ m¯2t. We will consider each stage in
turn.
Stage 1. Both farmers’ inertias are binding (m¯1 = m1 and m¯2 = m2).
As both m¯1t and m¯2t are binding, we have m1t = m¯1t and m2t = m¯2t.
m1t = m1,t−1 + β1
(
e− pt−1 − b− q
2a
+
q
2d
−m1,t−1
)
=
(
1− β1 − β1d
2a
)
m1,t−1 − β1d
2a
m2,t−1 + β1
(
1 +
d
a
)(
e− N¯/2 + q
2d
)
,
m2t = m2,t−1 + γ2
(
m1,t−1 −m2,t−1
)
= (1− γ2)m2,t−1 + γ2m1,t−1 .
This relationship defines a system of first order linear difference equations. This
system can be solved according to the methodology given in appendix C.
We can construct upper bounds for technology adoption in this case if we
ignore the β1d
2a
m2,t−1 term in the above equation for m1t:
m1t =
(
e− N¯/2 + q
2d
)(
1− (1− β1 − β1d
2a
)t−1
)
,
m2t = (e− N¯
2
+
q
2d
)
(
1− (1− γ2)t
)
+ γ2(e− N¯
2
+
q
2d
)
t−1∑
i=0
(1− γ2)i(1− β1 − β1d
2a
)t−i ,
where β1d
2a
is small, these upper bounds will give a good approximation to the true
value.
Stage 2. Only one farmer’s inertia is binding (m¯1 > m1 and m¯2 = m2).
As m¯2t is binding and m¯1t is non-binding, it follows that m2t = m¯2t and m1t =
e− n1t + q/2d.
m2t = m2,t−1 + γ2
(
m1,t−1 −m2,t−1
)
=
(
1− γ2 − γ2d
2a+ d
)
m2,t−1 + γ2
(
1 +
d
2a+ d
)(
e− N¯/2 + q
2d
)
=
(
e− N¯/2 + q
2d
)(
1− (1− γ2 − γ2d
2a+ d
)t−1
)
+m2,t2(1− γ2 −
γ2d
2a+ d
)t−t2 ,
m1t = e− N¯/2 + q
2d
+
d
2a+ d
(e− N¯/2 + q
2d
−m2t)
= (e− N¯/2 + q
2d
) +
d
2a+ d
(e− N¯/2 + q
2d
−m2,t2)(1− γ2 −
γ2d
2a+ d
)t−t2 .
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These results are identical to those in stage two of special case 4 (where α1 and
γ2 are non-zero). This makes it clear that during stage two, both farmers’ adoption
decisions depend solely on the behavior of the farmer who’s inertia is still binding.
Figure 8 illustrates farmers’ technology adoption (mit) over time in special
case 5. This figure has been drawn with β1 = 0.20 and γ2 = 0.15.
It is clear from special case 5 that a farmer’s motivation to adopt new tech-
nology because their existing technology is not optimal (as represented by β) has a
strong short term effect that weakens over time. In contrast, a farmer’s motivation
to adopt new technology in response to observing adoption by other farmers (as
represented by γ) has a weak effect in the short term, but a stronger effect in the
medium term.
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Figure 8. Farmers’ technology adoption over time (special case 5)
This is consistent with our intuition: when farmers’ existing technology is not
optimal then farmers have significant scope and opportunity to use innovation and
technology adoption as a means of increasing profits. As it may take several time
periods for the benefits of technology adoption to be obvious, farmers who adopt
technology only after observing its adoption on similar farms may be slow to adopt
new technology before its benefits are well established, but will adopt technology
rapidly once its benefits are known.
Looking at all the special cases we have considered in this section we make
three observations of the model’s performance.
1. Farmers’ technology adoption is exponential with respect to the βi and γi pa-
rameters and linear with respect to the αi parameter. When α2 = 0 this means
that during stage two both farmers’ technology decisions can be expressed as a
weighted average of their technology at the start of stage two (mi,t2) and their
3.4. MITIGATION DECISIONS FOR TWO FARMERS 47
equilibrium technology (mi,t3 = e − N¯/2 + q/2d), where the weights are an
exponential function of the number of time periods that have passed since the
stage of stage two (t− t2).
2. We note that the αi, βi and γi parameters of farmer one only appear in the an-
alytic expressions for each farmers’ adoption decisions in stage one. And that
neither of farmers’ αi, βi and γi parameters appear in the analytic expression
for farmers’ decisions in stage three. This suggests that, for a fixed nutrient
cap, once a farmer’s inertia becomes non-binding it has no further effect on
any farmers’ adoption decisions. By extension, we would expect that in an n-
farmer case (with n+1 stages) the technology adoption decisions of all farmers
in stage z would be a function of the inertia of the n + 1 − z farmers who’s
inertia was still binding. This suggests that once a farmer’s inertia becomes
non-binding and they cease to adopt new technology, their ongoing decisions
have minimal impact on those farmers who’s inertia is still binding.
3. Figures 4 to 8 demonstrate that the first farmer(s) to adopt technology may
adopt more technology than is optimal in the long run. As the adoption of
technology is costly this imposes a cost on these farmers. However, all farmers
experience higher profits as a result of one farmer adopting additional tech-
nology (proposition 5). The presence of this externality, that early adopters
bear a cost while benefiting all farmers, may justify intervention by the regula-
tor. Such intervention could take the form of subsidies for early adopters, the
funding of farm trials and demonstrations, or the introduction of minimum
standards to hasten the slow adopters.
While our model suggests some farmers will adopt more technology than is
optimal in the equilibrium, we expect that the magnitude of this over-adoption will
be much smaller in reality for two reasons. First, our solution algorithm assumes
farmers are short-sighted and so will adopt technology if it is profitable in the cur-
rent year regardless of whether it is likely to be profitable in future years. In reality,
farmers are forward looking and are likely to avoid adopting technology unless it
will benefit their farm over multiple years. Second, our model ignores the possibil-
ity that farmers will expect other farmers to contribute ‘their fair share’ of nutrient
mitigation and technology adoption. In reality farmers may slow or cease to adopt
technology once they perceive themselves to have carried out their ‘share’ of the
work. While both these reasons will reduce farmers’ motivation to over-adopt tech-
nology, we would expect over-adoption to occur in reality especially in situations
where there are significant differences between the rates at which farmers adopt
technology.
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Chapter 4
Many Farmer Case: General Model
Performance
Analytic analysis of farmers’ technology adoption decisions in the many farmer case
is intractable. In order to observe the performance of the model with three or more
farmers we construct a numerical model. This model is written and solved in Mat-
lab (release 2012b) and follows the solution algorithm given in section 2.2 with an
annual time step. We wrote our own solver for this study using a combination of
quasi-Newton methods and line search algorithms. The code and key data files are
available from the author upon request.
In this chapter, we first suggest parameter values for the farm profit func-
tions and for farmers’ inertia functions. These parameter values are then used to
demonstrate the performance of the model. We discuss both the adoption of new
technology and the cost of mitigating nutrient emissions in our results.
4.1 Parameterizing the model
According to the functional forms we have proposed for the farm profit and farmer
inertia functions (chapter 2), the behavior of any given farmer is described by ten
parameters: six of these determine the farm’s profitability and the remaining four
determine the farmer’s inertia, equations (2.12) and (2.17) respectively (see table 5
for a brief overview).
As the emphasis of this study is farmers’ adoption of technology we will not
consider heterogeneity in farms’ profit functions, but will allow for heterogeneity
in farmers’ inertia functions. Hence all farmers will have identical a, b, c, d, e and q
values but may differ in their αi, βi, γi and δi values, i = 1, ..., I .
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Function Parameter Description
profit
a Farm production revenue (quadratic term)
b Farm production revenue (linear term)
c Farm production revenue (constant term)
d Cost of using non-optimal technology
e Nutrient emissions before regulation
q Cost of technology
inertia
α How frequently farm technologies are updated
β Profit motivation of farmer
γ Farmer’s willingness to learn from others
δ Farmer’s overall resistance to change
Table 5. Overview of model parameters
For this demonstration of the model, we are unable to estimate the model
parameters formally due to data limitations. The profit of farms with sub-optimal
choices of technology are seldom reported, and we do not have records of farmers’
past technology adoption. Instead of estimating the parameters, we will calibrate
the model so that farmers’ technology adoption is similar to previously observed
adoption patterns. This means that our parameter estimates, and the correspond-
ing results, should only be considered as indicative. We will describe possible ap-
proaches to fitting the model parameters, and their data requirements, in chapter
6.
Parameter values for dairy farm profits per hectare per year in New Zealand
can be obtained extending the approach in Anastasiadis et al. (2011). We will use
results from Smeaton et al. (2011) and Doole & Pannell (2009) who model farm per-
formance across a range of different technology choices and management practices.
Their results link farm profits (pi), nutrient emissions (n) and technology (m).
Smeaton et al. (2011) use the Farmax (Bryant et al. 2010) and OVERSEER
(AgResearch 2009) models to demonstrate the performance of a representative dairy
farm in the Bay of Plenty region, New Zealand. In their analysis, farmers are as-
sumed to always use the optimal level of technology, so mit = m∗it. It follows that
mit ≈ ei − nit + qi/2di so, the results by Smeaton et al. (2011) capture the following
sub-part of farms’ profit function (2.12):
pii(mit, nit) = ainit
2 + binit + ci − qimit .
However, as they do not explicitly report the level or cost of technology we are
unable to estimate qi from their results. Instead, we will assume qi = 0 and allow
for the cost of technology to be captured implicitly by our estimates for the ai, bi
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and ci parameters. We estimate these parameters by fitting a quadratic curve to the
relationship between profit (pii(mit, nit)) and emissions (nit) given by Smeaton et al.
(2011).1
Doole & Pannell (2009) use a non-linear programing approach to model re-
ductions in nitrogen emissions on heterogeneous farms in the Waikato region, New
Zealand.2 In their analysis, farmers do not adopt any new technologies, but only
consider changes in fertilizer application, stocking rates, and the use of maize silage.
It follows that mit = 0 for all observations. Given the parameter estimates (aˆi, bˆi and
cˆi) that we construct from Smeaton et al. (2011), we can control for the variation in
profit due to changes in farm emissions. Any remaining variation in farm profit can
be attributed to the cost of using non-optimal technology (di). We estimate di from
the following equation:
pii(mit, nit)− (aˆinit2 + bˆinit + cˆi) = di(eˆi − nit)2 + ui .
We include ui as an additive constant to account for level differences in farm prof-
itability between the Waikato and Bay of Plenty regions. The parameter eˆ can be
obtained from Rutherford et al. (2011) who estimate nitrogen emissions for different
land uses in the Lake Rotorua catchment, New Zealand.
Table 6 gives the parameter estimates for the farm profit functions as esti-
mated from Smeaton et al. (2011), Doole & Pannell (2009), and Rutherford et al.
(2011). All these parameters have been estimated on a per hectare basis (e.g.: pii(·)
and nit are measured in dollars, and kg of nitrogen, per hectare respectively). As
Rutherford et al. (2011) suggest that there is a non-zero, unavoidable level of nitro-
gen emissions (some nutrients will be lost even from undeveloped land) we have
estimated these parameters with respect to only those emissions that a farmer can
manage.
Parameter aˆ bˆ cˆ dˆ eˆ qˆ
Value -0.3347 41.46 92.08 -0.3757 52 0
Table 6. Parameters for dairy farms’ profit functions
Estimates of farmers’ αi, βi, γi and δi parameters are harder to construct. We
will provide parameter values that are consistent with existing farm data and adop-
tion curves. To account for heterogeneity in farmers’ inertia we will estimate a range
for each parameter that is likely to encompass farmers’ individual parameter values.
1It can be shown that this assumption and the following parameter estimation results in estimates
for bi and ci that incorporate qi as follows: bˆi ≈ bi + qi and cˆi ≈ ci − qiei − q2i /2di.
2Doole & Pannell (2009) report the minimum and maximum profit and nutrient emissions for
their heterogeneous farms. We conduct our analysis on a hypothetical median farm with emissions
and profit halfway between the maximum and minimum reported values.
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We assume that farmers plan investments with ten to fifteen year time hori-
zons. If farmers consider updating at most one-fifth of their existing farm technolo-
gies across any given time horizon then this could be reflected in the model with αi
values between 0.02 and 0.0133 (updating 20 percent of the farm over ten years is
equivalent to updated 0.02 of the farm each year) assuming a constant rate of updat-
ing. These numbers are broadly consistent with farmers’ assets and depreciation as
reported by the Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) conducted by
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) for 2010. Therefore, we will
consider αi ∈ [0.0133, 0.02].
Using USDA data for 31 states and 132 crop reporting districts, Griliches
(1957) investigates the adoption of hybrid corn in the US. Suppose that farmers’
adoption of hybrid corn (a new technology) is typical of farmer behavior in two re-
gards: the length of time it takes farmers to fully or partly adopt new technology,
and the maximum proportion of adoption that takes place. The percentage of total
corn acreage planted using hybrid seeds over time for five different states is given by
Griliches (1957). From this, we observe the time from when a state began to adopt
hybrid corn to the times when forty and ninety percent of the state had adopted.
These values are given in table 7. We also observe that long run adoption is 95 to
100 percent of full adoption for the states of Iowa, Wisconsin and Kentucky.
State Iowa Wisconsin Kentucky Texas Alabama
Years to 40% adoption 4 5 6 6 8
Years to 90% adoption 7 11 14 x x
Table 7. Adoption rates of hybrid corn. Source: Griliches (1957)
We wish to determine the broadest range of βi values that are consistent with
farmers adopting 90 percent of their long run technologies in seven to eleven years
(as we observe for Iowa and Wisconsin). Given the profit function parameters in
table 6, we solve the inertia model with a range of βi values when αi = 0.0133 and
when αi = 0.02. By allowing for αi to take its most extreme values we observe
the greatest range of possible βi values. Our results suggest that βi values between
0.042 and 0.112 are consistent with farmers adopting 90 percent of their long run
technologies in seven to eleven years. Therefore we will consider βi ∈ [0.042, 0.112].
We wish to determine the broadest range of γi values that are consistent with
farmers adopting 40 percent of their long run technologies in six to eight years (as we
observe for Kentucky, Texas and Alabama). We divide the farmers into two groups.
For the first group of farmers βi > 0 and γi = 0, this group can be thought of as
consisting of innovative, profit driven farmers. For the second group of farmers
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βi = 0 and γi > 0, this group can be thought of as consisting of socially receptive
farmers (these farmers can learn from any farmer in the first group). Given the profit
function parameters in table 6, we solve the inertia model with a range of γi values
for the second group, for all combinations of the most extreme αi and βi values (so
βi equals 0.042 or 0.112 for the first group, and αi equals 0.0133 or 0.02 for either
or both of the groups). By allowing αi and βi to take their most extreme values we
observe the greatest range of possible γi values. Our results suggest that γi values
between 0.025 and 0.50 are consistent with farmers adopting 40 percent of their long
run technologies in six to eight years. Therefore we will consider γi ∈ [0.025, 0.050].
We wish to determine the largest δi value that is consistent with at least 95
percent of full technology adoption (as we observe for the states of Iowa, Wisconsin
and Kentucky). As before we divide farmers into two groups: innovative, profit
driven farmers and socially receptive farmers. Given the profit function parameters
in table 6, we solve the inertia model with a range of δi values, for all combinations of
the most extreme βi and γi values (so βi equals 0.042 or 0.112 for the first group and
γi equals 0.025 or 0.50 for the second group). As the αi and δi parameters interact we
require αi = 0 for all farmers and interpret our results as estimating the appropriate
difference between δi and αie. Our results suggest the δi values of at most 1.2 larger
that αiei are consistent with at least 95 percent of full technology adoption in the
long run (40 years). Therefore we will consider δi − αie ∈ [0, 1.2].
Parameter αˆi βˆi γˆi δˆi − αˆieˆi
Minimum value 0.0133 0.042 0.025 0
Maximum value 0.020 0.112 0.50 1.2
Table 8. Parameters for farmers’ inertia functions
Table 8 summarizes our parameter estimates for farmers’ inertia functions,
(2.17) - (2.18). Our aim in estimating these coefficients is to provide a range of values
for which farmers’ inertia functions produce behavior similar to that observed in
reality as given by Griliches (1957). We make no claims as to the accuracy of these
parameter estimates, and use them only to illustrate our model.
4.2 Demonstrated model performance
For this demonstration of the model, we will consider 100 farmers each managing a
100 hectare farm. Following the classification given by Ward et al. (2008) (table 2) we
assign these farmers into four groups: socially influenced, innovative, lifestyle and
capital constrained farmers. The proportion of farmers in each group is consistent
with the percentages given in table 4. We divide the parameter ranges given in
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table 8 into quintiles (high, medium-high, medium, medium-low, and low). Each
group of farmers will be assigned parameter values from specific quintiles that are
consistent with the suggested values given in table 4, section 2.6.
Farmers with a ++ value in table 4 will be assigned parameter values from
the high quintile. Farmers with a + value in table 4 will be assigned parameter
values from the medium-high quintile. Farmers with a blank value in table 4 will
be assigned parameters from the medium quintile. Farmers with a - value in table 4
will be assigned parameter values from the medium-low quintile. Farmers with a -
- value in table 4 will be assigned parameter values from the low quintile.
Individual heterogeneity in farmers’ inertias will be introduced by random-
izing individual farmer’s inertia parameters. We will draw each farmer’s αi, βi, γi
and δi parameters from the appropriate quintile according to a uniform distribution.
As we are not considering heterogeneity in farm profits, for all farmers we will use
the a, b, c, d, e and q values given in table 6. In the absence of data on farmers’ social
and professional networks we will assume that any farmer can learn from any other
farmer (Ii = {i = 1, ..., I}).
We will consider regulation that requires a 50 percent reduction in total emis-
sions from baseline. As farmers’ inertia parameters are randomly assigned we will
solve the model multiple times, each time with different parameters. Figures 9, 10,
11 and 12 summarize the model’s results for the catchment as a whole.3
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Figure 9. Technology adoption curves
Figure 9 gives the maximum, median and minimum technology adoption by
3In figures 9, 10 and 11 the results we present are constructed as means from 1001 model solutions
with randomized parameters. In figure 12 the result we present is a probability density function
constructed from the same 1001 model solutions.
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farmers over time. For example, in year 5, all farmers have adopted at least 40 per-
cent, more than half of farmers have adopted at least 55 percent, and no farmer
has adopted more that 65 percent of their equilibrium technology. We note that the
difference between maximum and median adoption is much smaller than the gap
between median and minimum adoption. So, while much of the catchment are less
than two years behind the leading innovators (those with the maximum amount
of technology), the slowest adopters in the catchment may be more than six years
behind. In addition, we observe that around year 12 the maximum adoption curve
exceeds 100 percent: some farmers will have adopted more than their equilibrium
level of technology (we identified and discussed the possibility of this phenomenon
in section 3.4, see in particular figures 6, 7 and 8).
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Figure 10. Adoption curves for specific technology thresholds
Figure 10 gives the proportion of farmers, over time, who have adopted at
least a specific percentage of their equilibrium technology. For example, in year 4:
almost 20 percent of farmers have adopted more than 50 percent of their equilibrium
technology; and in year 10: all farmers have adopted at least 50 percent, over 90
percent of farmers have adopted at least 75 percent, and the leading farmers are
only just beginning to adopt more than 95 percent of their equilibrium technology.
These curves are analogous to the adoption curves developed by Griliches (1957).
But rather than considering a specific technology, they consider specific quantities
of technology.4
Figures 9 and 10 provide two ways of viewing farmers’ technology adoption
4We note that some quantities of technology may be equivalent to specific technologies. Suppose
that in order for any farmer to reach 75 percent of their equilibrium technology adoption they had to
install a feed pad. In this case the 75 percent adoption curve in figure 10 would be equivalent to an
adoption curve for feed pads.
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over time. They suggests that, given our parameter choices, farmers are quick to
make an initial response to nutrient regulation (almost all farmers adopt 50 percent
of their equilibrium technology within five years). But full response to regulation
can be much slower (note that it takes some farmers a further five years to reach
75 percent of their equilibrium technology). This kind of information is of interest
to regulators and social planners as it provides an indication as to how technology
adoption varies between farmers.
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Figure 11. Costs of mitigation over time
Figure 11 gives the cost of mitigation, each period, over the entire catchment
for both the static economic and inertia models (equations (2.4) - (2.5) and (2.1) -
(2.3) respectively). We define the cost of mitigation as the difference between profits
before and after regulation (but ignoring the value of allowances) as this captures
the value of lost production due to mitigation.5 For this figure we have expressed
the cost as a percentage of profits before regulation. The static economic model is
likely to underestimate the costs of mitigation in the short run as it assumes farmers
adjust instantly to new regulation. In contrast, the inertia model provides an esti-
mate of costs that account for farmers being slow to adopt new technology. In our
example the cost of mitigation in the first few years is estimated to be up to 18 per-
centage points higher when inertia is considered. The difference between the two
models declines over time as farmers adopt technology and is minimal from year
ten onwards.
5Cost of mitigation over all farmers in period t =
∑
i pii(0, ei)− pii(mit, nit).
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Figure 12. Distribution of the percentage increase in costs due to inertia
Figure 12 gives the distribution of the percentage increase in costs due to iner-
tia. We define the increase in costs due to inertia as the percentage increase in the net
present value of the cost of mitigation, across all periods, under the inertia model
over the equivalent value under the static economic model.6 This is equivalent to
considering the (weighted) average difference between the two curves given in fig-
ure 11 (where the weights vary across time according to some discounting factor).
The distribution in figure 12 has been constructed over the 1001 model solutions
with randomly assigned values for farmers’ inertia parameters.7 We observe that on
average, the net present value of the cost of mitigation is estimated to be 11.6 percent
higher in the inertia model than in the static economic model, given our choice of
parameters (tables 6 and 8).
Figures 11 and 12 provide two ways of viewing similar information. They
both show the increases in costs due to farmers’ resistance to change. This kind
of information will be of interest to researchers who prefer to work with the static
economic model (perhaps due to its computational elegance, or because it can be
nested inside more complex analysis) and want an indication as to how much they
may underestimate the true costs. Local governments will also be interested in this
kind of information as it provides an estimate of the potential cost savings from
encouraging more rapid adjustment to regulation.
6Net present value of the cost of mitigation =
∑
t(1 + r)
−t∑
i pii(0, ei) − pii(mit, nit). We use a
discount rate, r, of seven percent as this is the rate preferred by the Bay of Plenty Regional Council
(Anastasiadis et al. 2011): the local government body who regulates one of the areas in New Zealand
from which we have used data to parameterize our farm profit function.
7This density has been constructed using kernel smoothing with a Gaussian kernel. A description
of kernel smoothing is provided in appendix D.
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4.3 Farmer performance
We disaggregate the results from the previous section to consider how adoption de-
cisions differ between the groups of farmers (socially influenced, innovative, lifestyle
and capital constrained). This enables us to consider the behavior caused by differ-
ent parameter choices. Recall that the proportion of farmers in each group is con-
sistent with the percentages given in table 4. This means that, in the hypothetical
catchment we are considering, there are 52 socially influenced, 25 innovative, 10
lifestyle and 13 capital constrained farmers.
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Figure 13. Technology adoption curves by farmer groups
Figure 13 gives the median technology adoption by each group of farmers
over time. For example, by year 5 the median lifestyle farmer has adopted 45 per-
cent, the median socially influenced farmer has adopted 55 percent and, the median
innovative and the capital constrained farmers have adopted 60 percent of their
equilibrium technology. We do not report or compare the maximum and minimum
adoption for any group over time as this would be misleading because there are a
different number of farmers in each group. We observe that, on average, during
the first five years the innovative farmers adopt the most technology, but they are
overtaken by the capital constrained farmers in year 6 and the socially influenced
farmers in year 10. The lifestyle farmers are consistently the slowest to adopt new
technology.
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Figure 14. Adoption curves for specific technology thresholds by farmer groups
Figure 14 gives the proportion of farmers, over time, who have adopted at
least a specific percentage of their equilibrium technology. For example, 80 percent
of lifestyle farmers have adopted at least 50 percent of their equilibrium technology
by year 6 and at least 75 percent by year 10. For clarity we have given the adoption
curves for 50, 75 and 95 percent of equilibrium technology in separate panels. Note
that while all three panels share the same vertical axis, the horizontal axis differs
between panels.
The slope of the technology adoption curves given in figure 14, provides an
indication of the heterogeneity within each group of farmers. The adoption curves
in the left most panel of figure 14 are very steep. This suggests that there is very
little variation between farmers within each group for the first five years. While
figures 9 and 10 show variation between all farmers in the catchment during the first
five years, this variation must be due to differences between the groups of farmers
rather than differences within each group of farmers. We observe relatively flatter
adoption curves for the innovative and lifestyle farmers in the second and third
panels of figure 14. This suggests that the between farmer variation within these
groups becomes more pronounced over time.
From figures 13 and 14, we observe that farmers’ adoption in the first few
years is ordered according to the value of their β parameter (The innovative farmers
have the highest β values and adopt the most technology in the first five years, while
the lifestyle farmers have the lowest β values and adopt the least technology). We
also note that in the long term the socially influenced and the capital constrained
farmers may adopt more technology than the innovative farmers. This suggests
that the β parameter has a strong effect on adoption only in the short term.
Technology adoption for the socially influenced farmers is largely driven by
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their γ value. As their γ values may be very large (between 0.405 and 0.5), the
steepness of the adoption curves in figure 14 is to be expected: As soon as one farmer
(the leading technology adopter) has adopted a given level of technology, all the
socially influenced farmers will adopt very similar levels of technology within two
years.
The fact that the capital constrained farmers have the most technology from
year six to year thirteen is most likely driven by their very low δ values. This is the
key difference between the socially influenced farmers and the capital constrained
farmers. Both groups of farmers have low β and very high γ values, but the so-
cially influenced farmers have higher α values. If the socially influenced and the
capital constrained farmers had the same δ values we would expect the socially in-
fluenced farmers to adopt more technology. However as the capital constrained
farmers adopt more technology than the socially influenced farmers, it follows that
the key determinant of their technology adoption must be their low δ value.
Farmers’ δ values act to suppress farmers’ technology adoption decisions
each year. We would expect that the technology adoption of farmers with higher
δ values slows sooner than the adoption of farmers with lower values. This may
help explain why there is little difference between the lifestyle and the innovative
farmers in year fifteen, despite the innovative farmers having higher β and γ values
than the lifestyle farmers: The lifestyle farmers have lower δ values and are hence
adopting technology faster in the long term.
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Figure 15. Distribution of the increase in costs due to inertia by farmer groups
Figure 15 gives the distribution of the percentage increase in costs due to in-
ertia for each group of farmers (as per figure 12). These distributions have been
calculated over the 1001 model solutions with randomly assigned values for farm-
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ers’ inertia parameters. So, the costs estimated for the innovative and socially re-
sponsive farmers (as well as for the catchment as a whole) are between 11 and 12
percent higher under the inertia model than under the static economic model. While
the costs for the lifestyle and capital constrained farmers are on average 8.5 and 13
percent higher, respectively, under the inertia model than under the static economic
model. This might seem to run counter to proposition 4 as the farmers who adopt
more technology have higher costs due to inertia. However, proposition 4 considers
profit net of the value of allowances, while in this case we have excluded the value
of allowances.
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Figure 16. Distribution of the costs due to inertia including the value of allowance
Figure 16 gives the distribution of the percentage increase in costs due to in-
ertia as in figure 15. But while the costs reported in figure 15 have been calculated
excluding the value of allowances (as they have been for figures 11 and 12), the costs
reported in figure 16 are net of the value of allowances (as they have been for propo-
sitions 4 and 5).8 These results are consistent with proposition 4: the innovative and
the capital constrained farmers (who adopt technology rapidly) have lower costs
under the inertia model than the lifestyle farmers (who adopt technology slowly).
The differences between figures 15 and 16 are driven by different definitions
of costs. While the costs considered in figure 15 include only those arising from in-
vesting in new technology and from reducing production, the costs considered in
figure 16 also include the value of nutrient allowances. Recall from proposition 3
that farmers with more technology will hold fewer allowances. It follows that the
farmers who adopt the least technology will hold the most nutrient allowances, and
that the farmers who hold the most nutrient allowances will have the highest pro-
duction. Hence those farmers who have adopted the least technology will appear to
8Cost of mitigation in period t net of the value of allowances =
∑
i pii(0, ei)− (pii(mit, nit)− ptnit).
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face lower costs when the value of nutrient allowances is ignored.
These two figures highlight the potential for confusion to arise over the value
of technology adoption. Where farmers are provided with an initial allocation of
allowances free of charge they may fail to account for the value of their allowances
when estimating farm profitability. This may give rise to the perspective that farm-
ers who adopt less technology are better off.
Furthermore regulation where farmers’ initial (and free) allocation of allowances
each year is determined by their emissions in the previous year (or in recent years)
will be counter productive. Because nutrient allowances are valuable, this approach
to allocating allowances punishes farmers who adopt technology and reduce nutri-
ent emissions, but rewards farmers who resist lowering their nutrient emissions.
Those farmers who adopt technology, and hence reduce emissions, would have
lower profits from their farming activity and would also receive fewer nutrient allo-
cations in future years. In comparison, those farmers who do not adopt technology
would have higher profits from their farming activity and would also be rewarded
for their non-adoption by higher nutrient allocations in future years. Regulation
with this kind of allocation scheme would provide a disincentive for farmers to
adopt new technology, further slowing the adoption of new technology and increas-
ing the cost to the catchment due to inertia.
Chapter 5
Random Inertia
While the inertia function (2.17) - (2.18) specified in section 2.5 may be a good indi-
cator for farmers’ intention to adopt new technology, there may be factors outside
farmers’ control that result in actual technology adoption differing from intended
adoption. These factors result in random variations in the environment in which
the farm and farmer operate. We distinguish between two types of random varia-
tions that may arise: global and individual errors.
Global, or catchment wide, errors are those that affect all farmers in a similar
way. They include variations in weather, changes in market conditions and prices,
and the development (and validation or failure) of new technologies.
Individual, or farmer specific, errors are those that affect a single farmer inde-
pendently of all other farmers. They include changes in personal circumstances, the
availability of farm staff and expertise, and the adjustment of adopted technologies
to the specific context of the farm. They may also capture the impacts of global er-
rors that are distributed unevenly across farmers (for example, exposure to weather
patterns as determined by farm location in the catchment).
Note that within the Economics literature (see for example Ireland 2004),
these errors might be referred to as shocks. However, as we do not consider the
arrival of the events that cause these errors or their individual magnitudes, but in-
stead focus on their aggregate impact on farmers’ decisions, we will use the term
errors to avoid confusion with the notion of shocks in the Statistics and Operations
Research literature (see for example Boland & Proschan 1983).
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5.1 Modeling random inertia
Recall from equations (2.17) - (2.18), that git provides a measure of the motivation
of (or pressure on) farmer i to adopt new technology, and that ∆m¯it gives the max-
imum amount of new technology that farmer i is willing to adopt in period t. We
allow the random errors on farmers’ inertia to affect farmers’ adoption of new tech-
nology by changing the motivation of farmer i to adopt as follows:
git = αieiτi + βi
(
m∗i,t−1 −mi,t−τi
)
+ γi
(
max
j
{mj∈Ii,t−1} −mi,t−τi
)
+ εt + εit , (5.1)
where εt and {εit} are independent random variables: εt ∼ N(0, σ2) denotes the
global error at time t, and εit ∼ N(0, σ2i ) denotes the individual error for farmer i at
time t.
We have chosen to introduce random errors on git. This means that positive
errors must also overcome farmers’ overall resistance to change (δi). For example,
consider a farmer with ∆m¯it = 0 as git < δi before random errors are introduced.
Suppose this farmer is subjected to a positive error, say ε. In order for the error to
result in technology adoption it must be large enough such that git + ε > δi.
The choice of distribution for the random variables ε and {εi} determines the
relative likelihood that errors will be positive or negative, and the possible magni-
tudes of any errors. In the absence of strong preferences for any other shape, we
have assumed that errors follow a normal distribution. Hence positive and negative
errors are equally likely and small to moderate errors are more common than large
errors.
The magnitudes of σ and {σi} must be interpreted with respect to farmers’
intentions to adopt technology. Consider the inertia model without randomness
(as demonstrated in chapters 3 and 4): from this we can calculate farmers’ average
intention to adopt technology (the mean of git when ∀i, t : εt, εit = 0). The ratio of
farmers’ average adoption intentions to σ and σi gives an indication of the relative
significance of errors on farmers’ actual technology adoption.
The introduction of global and individual errors will increase the volatility of
farmers’ technology adoption. Global errors will affect the technology adoption of
the entire catchment in the same way: so their primary effect will be to change the
adoption of technology across all farmers. Individual errors will affect the technol-
ogy adoption of different farmers in different ways: so their primary effect will be
to change the differences in technology adoption between farmers.
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5.2 Model performances with random inertia
We demonstrate the inertia model with random inertia using the approach given in
section 4.2. The results in this section differ from those in chapter 4 by the inclusion
of global, εt, and individual errors, {εit}.
As farmers are adopting 26 units of technology (to support a 50 percent re-
duction in baseline emissions ei = 52) within about 15 years, their average rate of
technology adoption is approximately 1.73 units per hectare per year. We choose
σ = 0.5 and σi = 0.5, for all i. This ensures that random variations in farmers’ iner-
tia (εt or εit) are likely to be less than half of farmers’ average technology adoption
(εt, εit < 1.73/2).
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Figure 17. Technology adoption curves with individual errors
Figure 17 gives the maximum, median and minimum technology adoption
by farmers over time when subject to individual errors. The results from the de-
terministic case (as per figure 9) are given in gray. As the expected value of the
errors is zero, we might expect that on average random errors would have no effect.
However, we observe that individual errors result in faster maximum and median
technology adoption. This suggests that there are spillover effects from positive er-
rors that are not completely countered by negative errors. We discuss the effect of
each of these errors next.
Suppose there are several farmers who have adopted very similar levels of
technology to the farmer with the most amount of technology. If any one of these
farmers experiences a positive individual error, their technology adoption will in-
crease (mit will be higher than it would have been without the error), and the max-
imum level of technology adopted by any farmer will also increase (maxj{mjt} will
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be higher than it would have been without the error). Recall from (2.18) that farmers
learn by comparing their level of technology with the maximum level of technology
in use. Hence, as positive errors increase the maximum level of technology adop-
tion, they result in increased technology adoption due to learning.
Alternatively, if the farmer with the most technology experiences a nega-
tive individual error, their technology adoption will slow (mit will be lower than it
would have been without the error), but there will be minimal decrease in the max-
imum level of technology adopted by any farmer (maxj{mjt}will change very little
despite the error) because there exist farmers with very similar levels of technol-
ogy, at least one of which is likely not to have experienced a negative error. Rather
than learning from the farmer who had the most technology, but suffered a negative
error, other farmers will instead learn from a farmer who had very similar levels
of technology and did not suffer a negative error. Hence, as negative errors have
minimal impact on the maximum level of technology adoption, they result in little
decrease in technology adoption due to learning.
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Figure 18. Adoption curves for specific technology thresholds with individual errors
Figure 18 gives the proportion of farmers, over time, who have adopted at
least a specific percentage of their equilibrium technology, when subject to individ-
ual errors. The results from the deterministic case (as per figure 10) are given in
gray. We observe that individual errors result in faster technology adoption than
the deterministic results as farmers approach equilibrium. While much of this effect
will be due to learning spillovers, part of this effect will be due to how the effect of
errors changes over time.
Consider that as farmers approach their equilibrium technology, the rate at
which they adopt new technology decreases. As the magnitude of errors is inde-
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pendent of the rate at which farmers are adopting new technology, the magnitude of
individual errors relative to a farmer’s new technology adoption will be increasing
with time. Furthermore, as a farmer approaches equilibrium the impact of negative
errors decreases as farmers can not adopt less than zero units of new technology.
It follows that while the expected value of individual errors is zero, their average
effect over time is positive as farmers approach equilibrium.
This is consistent with our intuition as to how farmers behave in reality: In the
short term, after the introduction of regulation farmers will be most active adopting
new technologies. While errors may help or hinder their adoption of new technol-
ogy, they are likely to make some changes each year. However, once farmers have
adopted most of the technology they need, further technology adoption is unlikely
to be a priority and will be delayed until the circumstances are right (as represented
by a positive error).
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Figure 19. Adoption curves for specific technology thresholds with global errors
Figure 19 gives the proportion of farmers, over time, who have adopted at
least a specific percentage of their equilibrium technology, when subject to global
errors. The results from the deterministic case (as per figure 10) are given in gray.
We observe that global errors result in adoption curves that suggest faster adoption
in early years and slower adoption in later years (this is easiest to observe for the 95
percent curve).
This is almost entirely due to the construction of these curves as averages.1
Consider that a positive (negative) global error means that all farmers reach any
given technology adoption threshold earlier (later). This is effectively a translation
1As in chapter 4, figures 17, 18 and 19 are constructed as averages over 1001 model solutions. For
our results in this section we used the same random seeds for parameterizing the model as in chapter
4 to ensure that our results are directly comparable.
68 CHAPTER 5. RANDOM INERTIA
of the deterministic adoption curve to the left (right). When we consider the aver-
age of many adoption curves translated by global errors we get the curves given in
figure 19. It follows, that what we are observing in figure 19 is an increase in the
volatility of farmers’ technology adoption.
We constructed an alternative to figure 17 for the case where there are only
global errors, and alternatives to figures 17 and 18 for the case where there are both
kinds of errors. However, we do not provide these figures as the effect of global
errors is difficult to distinguish in the alternative figure 17, and (because there is no
interaction between the different sources of error) the effect of both global and indi-
vidual errors together is just the combination of the effect of having each source of
error separately.
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Figure 20. Distribution of the increase in costs due to inertia with random inertia
Figure 20 gives the distribution of the percentage increase in costs due to
inertia over 1001 model solutions with randomly assigned values for farmers’ inertia
parameters. We give the distributions for the cases where there are only individual
errors, only global errors, and when there are both individual and global errors.
The result from the deterministic case (as per figure 12) is given in gray. We observe
that individual errors result in a small decrease in the expected value of costs, while
global errors significantly increase the volatility of costs.
We expect that the impact of global errors on the cost of mitigation occurs
mostly as a result of errors in the short term. Suppose that in the first few periods
there were several positive (negative) errors, and no negative (positive) errors: the
joint impact of there errors is that farmers will adopt more (less) technology than
they would in the deterministic case. This will increase (decrease) their profits for
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all future time periods, decreasing (increasing) the cost of mitigation.2 That indi-
vidual errors decrease the expected cost of mitigation is consistent with farmers’
technology adoption as described by figures 17 and 18.
Figures 17 to 20 demonstrate the performance of the inertia model when
farmers’ adopt decisions are subject to random errors. Individual errors result in
learning spillovers that increase the overall rate of technology adoption. This is
because individual errors change the differences in technology adoption between
farmers. Global errors increase the volatility of all farmers’ adoption of new tech-
nology. This is because global errors change the average adoption across all farmers.
This information is of interest to stakeholders as it provides an indication
as to how actual outcomes might differ from those anticipated by the determinis-
tic model. Where regulators or local government are considering intervening in
the catchment to encourage adoption, this could be considered as a positive error.
Our results suggest that intervention that encourages technology adoption on those
farms that other farmers learn from will be the most effective.
2This effect will be compounded by considering the net present value of the cost of mitigation (as
we do when calculating the increase in costs due to inertia). As we use a positive discount rate when
calculating the net present value, the cost in the first few periods will have a larger relative impact
on our reported measure than the costs in the later periods.
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Chapter 6
Estimation and Validation
The parameters provided for the demonstration of the model, in chapters 4 and
5, were chosen to give results that are consistent with our expectations. However,
any practical application of the inertia model developed in this study requires the
successful completion of two steps: the estimation of the model parameters, and
evidence as to the validity of the model results.
This chapter has a two-fold purpose: First, we consider the data that would
be necessary to empirically estimate the model parameters and describe how these
estimates could be obtained. Second, we discuss some approaches to assessing the
validity of the model in comparison to the performance of previously implemented
environmental trading schemes.
6.1 Parameter estimation for farm profit functions
Recall that the behavior of any given farmer is determined by ten parameters (six for
farm profit and four for farmer inertia, see table 5). Just as the choice of functional
forms for farms’ profit and farmers’ inertia functions are independent of each other,
so also we can estimate the parameters for each of these functions independently.
The six parameters that define a farm’s profit function are ai, bi, ci, di, ei and qi.
Farm profit functions define the relationship between technology mit, nutri-
ent emissions nit, and profit pii(mit, nit). Any estimation of this relationship will
require observations that include farms’ technology, emissions and profit across a
variety of values. Note that to be consistent with our definitions, technology mit
must be measured as the amount of nutrients the adopted technology (or combina-
tion of technologies) can cost effectively mitigate.
Consider a dataset containing observations of farm technology, emissions
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and profit. Each data point must represent a feasible farm system: either a sys-
tem currently in use on some collection of farms, or a system that expert opinion
suggests farmers may adopt. Models of farm production (such as Farmax, Bryant
et al. 2010) and emissions (such as OVERSEER, AgResearch 2009) may help experts
to construct appropriate farm systems. Observations of current farm systems repre-
sent farming approaches that must be feasible. This type of data will be most useful
where there exists heterogeneity between existing farm systems and nutrient regu-
lation will encourage all farmers to move towards using the same type of existing
farm system. Observations of farm systems that farmers could theoretically adopt
(based on expert opinion) are able to capture the full potential of new technologies.
This type of data will be most useful when very few farmers are currently using the
key technologies.
To supplement this data we require information on each farm’s baseline nu-
trient emissions ei, and the cost of technology qi. Estimates for farms’ baseline emis-
sions must be known prior to any analysis taking place. These will depend on farm
inputs, land characteristics (including soil and topography) and the local climate
(including temperature and rainfall). The estimation of baseline nutrient emissions
is well established in practice, as this information is critical in order to justify the in-
troduction of any nutrient regulation on farmers (see for example Rutherford et al.
2011)
The cost of technology qi can be obtained in two different ways: either cal-
culated by an expert such as a farm consultant or technology supplier, or estimated
from observed farm profits at the same time as ai, bi, ci and di, below. If the cost of
technology is obtained from a farm consultant then farm profits should be adjusted
to exclude the cost of technology when estimating the parameters ai, bi, ci and di.1
Given nit, mit and an estimate for farm’s baseline emissions eˆi we may esti-
mate the parameters ai, bi, ci, di and qi according to farms’ profit function (2.12):
pii = ainit
2 + binit + ci + di(eˆi − nit −mit)2 − qimit .
Note that the profit function is linear with respect to the model parameters. As nit2,
nit, (eˆi− nit−mit)2 and mit can be constructed as our explanatory variables we may
estimate the parameters using linear regression.
Alternatively, if the cost of technology qi is know from a farm consultant or
technology supplier, then we need only estimate ai, bi, ci and di and may adapt (2.12)
1This differs from the approach we take in chapter 4. Where we were unable to identify the cost
of technology, we instead estimated the a, b, c and d parameters using profit values that included the
cost of technology. Hence the value of q was implicitly captured in our aˆ, bˆ, cˆ and dˆ values.
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as follows:
pii + qˆimit = ainit
2 + binit + ci + di(eˆi − nit −mit)2 .
Recall from section 2.3 that we require that profit is initially increasing with
nutrient emissions; marginal profit is deceasing with nutrient emissions; and the
change in profit with respect to nutrient emissions is initially decreasing with the
adoption of technology. These requirements imply that our parameters should take
specific signs.
We will consider each of the requirements from section 2.3, and the signs they
imply for our parameter, in turn. If these sign conditions are not satisfied, following
the estimation of the ai, bi, ci, di, ei and qi parameters, then either the functional form
of farms’ profit function or the use of the inertia model may not be appropriate.
• Consider the requirement that the change in profit with respect to nutrient
emissions is initially decreasing with the adoption of technology (up to some
level muit(nit)):
mit ∈ [0,muit(nit)]→
∂2pii
∂mit∂nit
< 0 .
Let muit(nit) = m∗it, then we are concerned with farms’ profit function when
mit < m
∗
it. From (2.12), if mit < m∗it, we have
∂2pii
∂mit∂nit
= 2di. This implies di < 0.
• Consider the requirement that marginal profit is decreasing with nutrient emis-
sions:
∂2pii
∂n2it
< 0 .
This must hold regardless of whether or not farmers’ use of technology is op-
timal. From (2.12), if mit < m∗it, we have
∂2pii
∂n2it
= 2ai + 2di; and from (2.12) and
(2.13), if mit = m∗it, we have
∂2pii
∂n2it
= 2ai. This implies ai < 0.
• Consider the requirement that profit is initially increasing with nutrient emis-
sions (up to some level nui ):
nit ∈ [0, nui ]→
∂pii
∂nit
≥ 0 .
This must hold regardless of whether or not farmers’ use of technology is op-
timal. From (2.12), if mit < m∗it, we have
∂pii
∂nit
= 2ainit + bi − 2di(ei − nit −mit);
and from (2.12) and (2.13), if mit = m∗it, we have
∂pii
∂nit
= 2ainit + bi. This implies
bi > 0.2
In addition, we require that the cost of technology is positive: qi > 0.
2We might expect that nui = ei, so that farmers’ baseline emissions are profit maximizing; or that
nui > ei, so farmers can earn more profit from further increasing emissions beyond baseline. Either
of these expectations further refine the constraint on the value of bi.
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6.2 Parameter estimation for farmers’ inertia functions
Farmers’ inertia functions determine their adoption of new technology as a func-
tion their past adoption decisions and the past adoption decisions of other farmers.
The four parameters that define a farmer’s inertia function are αi, βi, γi and δi. An
overview of the parameters can be found in table 5. Each farmer’s inertia function
also makes use of their farm’s baseline leaching, ei. We discuss the measurement of
ei in the previous section, and for this analysis we assume that it is known.
The ideal data set for estimating farmers’ inertia parameters would consist
of farmers’ technology, mit, and the technology that would have been optimal for
them, m∗i,t−1, for every farmer and for every time period. In addition we should like
to know the social and professional network Ii for each farmer i. From this data
it would be straightforward to construct and solve a regression for each farmer’s
parameter values according to the following equation.
∆mit = git − δi
= αieiτi + βi
(
m∗i,t−1 −mi,t−τi
)
+ γi
(
max
j
{mj inIi,t−1} −mi,τi
)− δi
Recall from (2.17) that ∆m¯it = 0 if git ≤ δi and ∆m¯it = git − δi if git > δi. As
0 ≤ ∆mit ≤ ∆m¯it if a farmer’s inertia is binding it follows that ∆mit will be left
censored (∆mit = 0 if git < δi). Regression analysis to determine farmers’ inertia
parameters will have to account for this censoring of the data. This can be done
using a Tobit model (Wooldridge 2010, provides a good explantion of the Tobit
model).
However, while farmers’ technology adoption, and social and professional
networks can be observed, it is difficult to measure the technology adoption that
should be optimal for farmers, m∗i,t−1. Furthermore, if farmers’ individual technol-
ogy adoption is not observed but only a measure of average technology adoption is
available, then it also becomes very difficult to determine the maximum technology
that farmer i can learn from maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1}.
We will consider three approaches to determining farmers’ inertia parame-
ters: (1) parameter estimation using proxies in place of m∗i,t−1 and maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1};
(2) parameter estimation using farmer survey data; and (3) model calibration to
match existing technology adoption curves.
Prior to considering any of these approaches we first discuss the estimation of
farmers’ αi parameter. This parameter represents how often the farmer replaces or
updates their existing farm technologies. Unlike the other parameters in the inertia
function, αi can be observed in the year-to-year management of the farm business
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(irrespective of nutrient regulation, or the availability of new technology). Consider
the financial statements produced by a farmer each year. Where adopted technolo-
gies represent assets to the farm their value will appear in the financial statements.
We can infer the frequency with which these assets are replaced from their annual
depreciation, which should also be reported in the financial statements. This fre-
quency will be an estimation for αi.
Proxies may be useful for estimating farmers’ inertia parameters (especially
βi and γi) where m∗i,t−1 and maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1} can not be observed. A potential proxy
form∗i,t−1 is a farmer’s expected equilibrium technology adoption. A potential proxy
for maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1} is technology that is being used or demonstrated on farms re-
gardless of whether or not they are part of farmers’ social and professional networks.
Note that in our demonstration of the model in chapter 4, m∗i,t−1 and maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1}
for each farmer i change as other farmers adopt new technology (m∗i,t−1 decreases
over time and maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1} increases). It follows that care must be taken to en-
sure that proxies for these values demonstrate similar behavior.3
Surveying farmers about when they would adopt technology could create a
dataset for estimating farmers’ inertia function parameters. Such a survey should
capture farmers’ intentions conditional on the information they are provided with.
This information would include what technology other farmers are adopting (to
represent maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1}) and what technology is likely to be optimal for them to
adopt (to represent m∗i,t−1). For example, consider the following questions:4
1. Here is a list of technologies and practices that could be used to manage your
farm’s nutrient emissions. Please identify any of these options that you are
already using on your property.
2. Suppose you were required to reduce the nutrient emissions from your prop-
erty by X percent. Please identify which technologies and/or practices you
would use to meet this reduction.
3. Here is a time-line. Please mark on it in which years you would use the tech-
nologies and/or practices you identified in the previous question.
4. Suppose your neighbor or friend installed technology Z on their farm in year
Y. Would your response to question 3 change in response to this additional
information? If so, what would you do differently?
5. Suppose that in year Y a farm consultant looked at your farm and provided
good evidence that technology Z would improve the profitability of your farm.
Would your response to question 3 change in response to this additional infor-
3Or the form of farmers’ inertia function must be revised to use the available data.
4These questions are only provided as an example to demonstrate the kind of information we
would like to collect. Proper survey design and execution are essential for collecting valid data.
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mation? If so, what would you do differently?
Analysis of these questions to estimate farmers’ βi and γi parameters would
focus on the difference between farmers’ responses to question three and farmers’
responses to questions four and five. The intention of question three is to identify
farmers’ technology adoption decisions when they have no information as to what
technology would be optimal and no other farmers to learn from (so m∗i,t−1 and
maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1} are implicitly zero). The intention of comparing questions three and
four is to identify how farmers’ technology adoption decisions change when they
have the opportunity to learn from other farmers (so maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1} is non-zero).
From this information we would estimate the value of farmers’ γi parameters. The
intention of comparing questions three and five is to identify how farmers’ technol-
ogy adoption decisions change when they have information as to what technology
would be optimal for them (so m∗i,t−1 is non-zero). From this information we would
estimate the value of farmers’ βi parameters.
From farmers’ answers to each of questions three, four and five we could
infer their intended technology use in the long run. Given estimates for farmers αi,
βi and γi parameters, we could use this information to estimate the value of farmers’
δi parameters.
Calibrating the model to match existing adoption curves is likely to be a less
data intensive approach than using proxies or surveying farmers. This approach
assumes that farmers’ adoption of technologies in the past will provide a good es-
timator of their technology adoption in the future. Inspection of figures 3, 6 to 8,
13 and 14 suggests that the effect of farmers’ profit motivations (represented by βi),
learning from others (represented by γi), and resistance to change (represented by
δi) on technology adoption vary over time.
In the short term, the years immediately following the introduction of regu-
lation, farmers will have adopted very little technology, and all farmers will have
similar levels of technology. This implies that m∗i,t−1 − mi,t−1 will be large and
maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1}−mi,t−1 will be small for most farmers. It follows that farmers’ tech-
nology adoption in the short term will be largely determined by the magnitude of
their βi parameters.
In the medium term, after farmers’ initial response to regulation, farmers
will have adopted some technology, and there will exist difference between indi-
vidual farmers’ technologies. This implies that m∗i,t−1 − mi,t−1 will be small and
maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1}−mi,t−1 will be large for most farmers. It follows that farmers’ tech-
nology adoption in the medium term will be largely determined by the magnitude
6.3. MODEL VALIDATION 77
of their γi parameters.
In the long term, before farmers have completely responded to regulation,
many farmers will be close to their equilibrium level of technology. This implies
that both βi(m∗i,t−1 −mi,t−1) and γi(maxj{mj∈Ii,t−1} −mi,t−1) will be small relative to
δi for most farmers. It follows that farmers’ technology adoption in the long term
will be largely determined by the magnitude of their δi parameter.
We can use the knowledge that the drivers of farmers’ technology adoption
vary over time to help calibrate the model. Suppose we partition an existing adop-
tion curve into short, medium and long terms. In the short term the effect of farmers’
profit motivation is strong, while the effect of farmers’ learning from others and re-
sistance to change is weak. This suggests that βi values should be calibrated using
the short term part of the adoption curve. In the medium term the effect of farmers’
learning from others is strong, while the effect of farmers’ profit motivation and re-
sistance to change is weak. This suggests that γi values should be calibrated using
the medium term part of the adoption curve. In the long term the effect of farm-
ers’ resistance to change is strong, while the effect of farmers’ profit motivation and
learning from others is weak. This suggests that δi values should be calibrated using
the long term part of the adoption curve.
6.3 Model validation
Formal validation of our model, and model results, requires detailed data on how
farmers respond to nutrient regulation. As regulation of farms as non-point sources
of emissions is still an emerging practice, we suspect that the necessary data is not
yet available. However, we are hopeful that this data will be collected in the course
of administering nutrient regulation of non-point sources.
We identify three ways to access the validity of the model given appropriate
data: (1) comparing the speed with which farmers adopt new technology in reality
against the speed suggested by our model; (2) comparing farms’ profits before and
after regulation against the profits suggested by our model; and (3) comparing the
actual cost of obtaining an environmental goal against the cost estimated by our
model. We discuss each of these approaches in turn.
Investigation of the speed with which farmers respond to nutrient regula-
tion would enable us to assess the validity of farmers’ inertia functions. This would
require records of farmers’ technology adoption over time. Construction of actual
and model technology adoption curves (as per figure 9) or adoption curves for spe-
cific technology thresholds (as per figure 10) would provide an excellent way to
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compare the model results to reality.
Investigation of farm level profits before and after regulation would enable
us to assess the validity of farms’ profit functions. We would compare the profit of
farms given their emissions and technology against the profit suggested by the farm
profit functions. This would require records for both emissions and technology as
well as actual farm profit. Some of this information could be obtained by linking the
number of allowances surrendered by each farmer under a nutrient trading scheme
with the technology and management practices each farmer reports using on their
farm. An analysis of this type might soon be possible in the Lake Taupo catchment,
New Zealand, where data on farm management and expected emissions are col-
lected by the regional council as part of approving any trade of nutrient allowances
(Duhon et al. 2012).
Investigation of the costs of obtaining an environmental goal would enable
us to assess the overall validity of the model, including how the profit and inertia
functions interact. This would entail a comparison of actual and model catchment
profits over time following the introduction of regulation (similar to the dashed line
in figure 11). As farm profits can be estimated from tax data or obtained from farm
surveys,5 this approach to model validation is likely to be the easiest to obtain data
for. However, without a supporting validation of the profit or inertia functions, this
analysis alone will not be sufficient to ensure the validity of the model. As apparent
consistency between the model and reality may be due to inconsistencies in farmers’
inertia and profit functions that happen to offset each other.
In the absence of detailed farmer level data, the validity of the model may
be demonstrated more generally using a range of other sources. These include how
farmers have responded to other water related regulations and trading schemes.
The Dairying and Clean Streams Accord (Fonterra Co-operative Group et al.
2003) is an agreement between Fonterra (representing dairy farmers collectively)
and the New Zealand government (both national and regional). It establishes tar-
gets for effluent management and stock exclusion from water ways in order to pre-
serve the quality of New Zealands streams and rivers. Snapshots of progress are
published every year, tracking the progress that is being made towards full exclu-
sion of stock and effluent from water ways (see for example, the most recent report:
Fonterra Co-operative Group et al. 2011). The accord expired in 2012, after around
ten years, with 85 and 70 percent of dairy farms having stock excluded from water
5See for example the Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) conducted by the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), or the farm monitor reports produced by the Min-
istry of Primary Industries (MPI), New Zealand.
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ways and compliant effluent systems respectively. While not directly comparable
to nutrient trading regulation, farmers’ behaviors in response to the accord are con-
sistent with the behaviors suggested by the inertia model. In particular: farmers
are still responding to the accord after ten years, and new response to the accord is
faster (slower) where fewer (more) farmers have already responded. Furthermore
we observe variations in response across regions of farmers under the accord, just
as we would observe variation between farmers (or groups of farmers) under the
inertia model.
Around 2009, New Zealand implemented a nutrient trading scheme for non-
point sources (farms) in the Lake Taupo catchment. Although this scheme is still
relatively young, with only 32 trade reported between January 2009 and June 2012
(Duhon et al. 2012), we are able to observe that the number of trades has become
more frequent over time. While there may be other contributing factors, this is
consistent with the motivation for our model: farmers display initial resistance to
change, but this resistance weakens over time.
Many regulatory schemes for water quality (more broadly than nutrients),
especially in the United States, focus on point sources (Selman et al. 2009). While in
a few cases non-point sources are regulated directly and trades between non-point
sources occur, in the majority of cases non-point sources are not included by default
but instead have the option to opt-in and trade with point sources. According to
Breetz et al. (2004) trades between non-point sources and trades from non-point to
point sources occur infrequently, much less than was originally anticipated. While
this will be due to a range of factors, the lack of non-point source opt-in and trading
is consistent with the ideas developed in our inertia model. That regulators are
not focusing on non-point source trading schemes may be due to a recognition that
farmers’ inertia will make it difficult to obtain support for such regulation and will
reduce the effectiveness of any regulation that would be passed.
A note on data from point sources: The fundamental difference between
point and non-point sources is that leaching from non-point sources is diffuse. This
means that almost any reduction in nutrient emissions must be accompanied by
some reduction in farm intensity or inputs. In contrast, point sources can achieve
reductions in nutrient emissions by installing technology, such as filters, at their
point(s) of discharge. In addition, point sources (such as sewage treatment plants)
tend to have greater access to finance and more research staff than non-point sources
who, in New Zealand, tend to be operated by an individual for whom their wealth,
wellbeing and sense of identity may be tied up in their business. Due to these fun-
damental differences data from point sources is of little help validating the model
described here.
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Chapter 7
Discussion and Conclusions
The inertia model developed in this study uses aspects of farmers’ behavior to de-
termine their technology adoption decisions over time when faced with nutrient
regulation. While many studies have identified factors that contribute to the adop-
tion of new technology by farmers, our study is among the first to develop a model
that explicitly captures the dynamics of farmers’ technology adoption decisions and
how these decisions impact the profitability of their farms.
Our work extends the static economic model for profit maximization given
an environmental constraint (equations (2.4) - (2.5)) by introducing an additional
constraint that requires farmers’ technology use each period to be similar to their
technology use in the previous period (our inertia constraint, equation 2.3). We
attribute this need for similarity between periods to farmers’ resistance to change,
which we describe as inertia.
We have specified both the general form of the model as well as specific func-
tional forms for the farm profit and farmer inertia functions. These specific func-
tional forms were chosen to provide an intuitive demonstration of the model. We
analytically investigated the individual technology adoption behavior of farmers in
several special cases when there are only two farmers. Our model suggests that
farmers’ profit motivation drives their technology adoption in the short term, and
that learning from other farmers drives technology adoption in the medium term.
Furthermore, when other farmers are slow to adopt technology, those farmers that
are the first to adopt new technology may adopt more technology than is optimal
in equilibrium. These results are of interest to policy makers where they want to
understand or encourage technology adoption by farmers.
Analysis of the model in the ‘many farmer’ case (chapter 4) is analytically in-
tractable. Hence we investigate the performance of the model in this case using a nu-
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merical approach. As we lacked the necessary data to formally estimate the model
parameters, these were instead chosen to produce behavior consistent with exist-
ing profit and adoption measures. Our results detail both how technology adoption
varies between farmers and how progressive technology adoption increases the cost
of regulation. For our choice of parameters the majority of farmers had similar tech-
nology adoption curves over time but a small number of farmers consistently took
longer to adopt new technology. Full technology adoption took more than 15 years
and the cost of satisfying the environmental target was estimated to be more than
11 percent higher under the inertia model than under the static economic model.
7.1 Extensions
The inertia model relaxes the assumptions that
1. farmers are willing to change,
2. farmers’ decisions are independent of their past decisions,
3. and farmers’ decisions are independent of the decisions of other farmers.
However, in doing this we have introduced two alternative assumptions. First, de-
cision makers are short sighted, and second, technology adoption can occur contin-
uously. We should like to further investigate the significance of these assumptions
and to further develop the model to consider alternatives to these assumptions.
In a static world, where prices and technologies are constant, we might expect
farmers to adopt technology as rapidly as possible. This kind of behavior arises in
our model from our assumption that decision makers are short-sighted. However,
as we move away from a static world, assuming short-sighted decision making be-
comes harder to justify: Farmers will have incentives to delay technology adoption,
not due to inertia, but because costs are expected to be more favorable in future
time periods. The assumption of short-sightedness could be replaced by incorpo-
rating farmers’ planning horizons (the length of time over which farmers make in-
vestment decisions) into the model and allowing farmers to optimize within their
planning horizon.
The inertia model allows for continuous technology adoption. Wheremit cap-
tures not just the technology that farmers have adopted but also how the technology
is incorporated into the farm system (and any associated management practices) it
may be reasonable to consider technology as a continuous decision. However, the
adoption of any specific technology (such as the installation of a feeding or winter-
ing pad) is a step increase in a farm’s technology. We could relax the assumption
that technology adoption is continuous by adapting the inertia model to allow for
discrete (or lumpy) technology adoption. This would enable us to construct adop-
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tion curves for specific technologies (instead of technology thresholds as per figures
10, 14, 18, and 19).
One of the frequent concerns with environmental markets is the potential for
local hot spots (see for example Schary & Fisher-Vanden 2004, in the case of water
quality). These occur where there is (spatial or temporal) clustering of the environ-
mental damages from emissions. So, despite the average environmental damage
being within acceptable levels, the damage in specific locations, or at specific times,
exceeds acceptable levels. Regulators who are concerned about the potential for hot
spots often respond with zonal emission restrictions (so emitters face both an overall
limit as well as a local limit on emissions) or trading ratios (so when farmers trade
there is not a one-to-one ratio between the decrease in the seller’s emissions and the
increase in the buyer’s emissions). The inertia model could be extended to account
for localized hot spots by introducing either of these regulatory responses.
We calibrated farmers’ inertia functions using existing technology adoption
curves. If the inertia model captures the key determinants of farmers’ technology
adoption then we might expect it to be able to replicate existing adoption curves.
If so, then this suggests that the S-shape of technology adoption curves for farmers
may be due to the aggregation of the decisions of many farmers who have different
motivations for adopting.1 Investigation of this has been left for future research.
Recall from section 2.1 that farm profits are additive in the social planner’s
objective function (2.1). This implies that profits from different farms are equiva-
lent and the social planner has no preference as to which farm, or farms, generate
the profits. This assumption need not hold and the inertia model could be easily
adapted by introducing weights into the social planner’s objective function (2.1).
Alternatively, we anticipate that an equivalent to introducing weights in the social
planner’s objective function could be accomplished by the use of trading ratios that
favor some farmers over other farmers.
The inertia model is a partial equilibrium model as it treats the available tech-
nologies, the environmental target, and commodity prices as exogenous. Our work
in this study could be nested within a more general economic framework that would
allow some of these factors to be endogenous. For example: new technologies may
be developed by innovative farmers, giving other farmers an incentive to delay tech-
nology adoption until the new technologies are proven; the cost of technologies may
decrease over time as more efficient approaches to construction or installation are
1We have observed the inertia model to produce S-shaped curves for total technology adoption
when there are a small number of profit-driven farmers (who’s adoption is driven by their βi param-
eter) and large number of learning-driven farmers (who’s adoption is driven by their γi parameter).
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developed (qi becomes time dependent); or the stringency of the environmental tar-
get may be adjusted by the regulator if the cost to farmers is perceived to be too
high. These more general frameworks might provide insight into how farmers’ re-
sistance to change affects not just their profitability but also the outcomes for their
communities.
In our model each farmer is described by ten parameters (ai, bi, ci, di, ei, qi,
αi, βi, γi and δi). We have provided an example of the calibration of our model
and the results it produces. However, it would be worthwhile to demonstrate the
application of this model to actual data. We anticipate that a more formal param-
eter estimation and model validation will be conducted once the appropriate data
becomes available.
7.2 Contribution
This study extends the static economic model for profit maximization under an en-
vironmental constraint (equations (2.4) - (2.5)) to account for farmers’ resistance to
change. The inertia model we have developed (sections 2.1 - 2.3) is able to capture
the short run dynamics of farmers’ technology adoption while being consistent with
the static model in equilibrium (section 3.1).
Farmers’ willingness and motivation to change is difficult to measure. How-
ever, by defining inertia as the maximum amount of technology a farmer will adopt
(m¯it), we are able to quantify it. While many studies have identified different drivers
of technology adoption for farmers (section 1.1), our model enables us to combine
the different factors that influence adoption decisions (such as profit, risk, learning,
and environmental concern) as part of farmers’ inertia function (2.3).
In section 2.4 and 2.5 we have provided functional forms for the farm profit
functions (2.12) and farmer inertia functions (2.17) - (2.18), respectively. These func-
tional forms were chosen for their simplicity and mathematical elegance in order to
ensure that our demonstration of the model is both intuitive and computationally
tractable. Propositions 2 - 5 (sections 3.2 - 3.3) prove that our choice of functional
forms are consistent with the outcomes we would expect in reality.
We demonstrate the performance of the inertia model in chapter 4. This in-
cludes outcomes for both the adoption of new technology (figures 9 and 10) and
the costs of mitigation (figures 11 and 12). Furthermore, these outcomes can be de-
composed for groups of farmers (figures 13 to 16). We anticipate that researchers
working with the static economic model will be interested in the type of results we
demonstrate as they provide an estimate of how results from the static model may
7.2. CONTRIBUTION 85
differ from reality.
While the inertia function may provide a good indication of farmers’ inten-
tions to adopt new technology, there will be other factors that influence farmers’
actual adoption. As one way to account for these factors we allow for farmers’ tech-
nology adoption to be subject to random errors (chapter 5). This highlights the value
of learning spillovers in encouraging more rapid technology adoption, and provides
further information to users of the static model, as to how their results may differ
from reality.
As the regulation of non-point source emissions from farms is still an emerg-
ing practice we lack the data necessary to formally estimate the model parameters,
or assess the validity of our model. Instead we provide a clear description as to what
such data would look like and how it might be obtained (chapter 6).
In developing the inertia model we have taken a novel approach to consid-
ering farmers’ technology adoption decisions. However, despite being unconven-
tional, our model is capable of reflecting a range of the complex behaviors observed
in reality without requiring complex mathematical structures. This helps make our
model intuitive, so stakeholders and policy makers can understand its key aspects
and implications with ease.
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Appendix A
Key Terminology
For readers who are less familiar with environmental regulation and nutrient trad-
ing, we provide a brief descriptions of the key terms used in this study.
• Emission Trading Schemes are regulatory tools that provide a fixed number of
allowances (forms, tokens) and the rules that govern the trading of allowances.
Each allowance entitles the bearer to emit a specified quantity of pollution
(nutrients , nitrogen, phosphorus, byproduct, discharge), after the which it
must be surrendered. Theory suggests that trading will encourage efficiency:
allowances will be used where they earn the greatest return.
• Allocations or Allowance Holdings refer to the number of allowances (forms,
tokens) that an entity / farmer owns. These include those allowances pro-
vided to the farmer directly by the regulator at the start of the regulation (ini-
tial allowances), possibly at zero cost (free allocation), plus or minus any al-
lowances gained or lost via exchanges with other entities / farmers (trading).
• The cap is the total number of allowances in an emissions trading scheme. It is
determined by the regulator to ensure that the environmental targets are met.
• NManager is a simulation model of the impacts of different designs of nitro-
gen management regulation on farms in the Lake Rotorua catchment (Anas-
tasiadis et al. 2011).
• Surface water flow is the flow of nutrients via rainfall runoff, streams and
rivers. These nutrients typically reach the lake less than a year after they are
lost from pasture.
• Groundwater flow is the flow of nutrients via underground aquifers and into
springs. These nutrients typically take many years to reach the lake. In the
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Lake Rotorua catchment, underground aquifers are large and some nitrogen
spends more than 100 years underground before reaching the lake.
• Point sources are emitters of pollution where the location of the emission oc-
curs at a point, for example: waste water from the end of a pipe. Factories,
power plants, vehicles are all point sources of emissions. The emissions from
a point source can typically be measured (mitigated) by attaching a device (fil-
ter) to the end of the pipe.
• Non-point sources are emitters of pollution where the location of the emission
is diffuse, for example: nutrient runoff into local waterways. Farms and mines
are non-point sources of emissions. More complex science is typically required
to measure the emissions from a non-point source. Often these emissions have
to be estimated. Some mitigation of non-point emissions can be done via con-
trols at the boundary of the source, for example: fencing or riparian planting.
While other mitigation can only be done via changing or reducing system in-
puts.
• The catchment is the land area within which nutrient emissions lead to in-
creased levels of nutrients in the local water body (lake, bay, river or stream).
For any water body, the size and shape of a catchment is determined by the
local topography and is approximately all the land from which water would
flow down hill towards the water body.
• Hot spots arise where there is (spatial or temporal) clustering of the environ-
mental damages from emissions. So despite the average environmental dam-
age being within acceptable levels, the damage in specific locations, or at spe-
cific times, exceeds acceptable levels.
Appendix B
Non-trading behavior
New Zealand farmers have expressed, not only a resistance to adopting new mitiga-
tion technologies and practices, but also a resistance to dealing with nutrient trading
regulation (Fenemor et al. 2012). These farmers have expressed a strong preference
to build their livelihood from farming and not from trading activities (we might ex-
pect a similar perspective from the traditionist farmers identified by Connor et al.
2008).
We propose an additional constraint for the inertia model, specified above,
that would enable it to reflect farmers’ preferences to earn their livelihood from agri-
cultural activity rather than the sale of allowances. The constraint anticipates that
farmers with this kind of preference are willing to buy allowances, as this enables
them to carry out further farming activities; but are unwilling to sell allowances if
this would require them to reduce their farming activities (though they may sell
unused or excess allowances).
Let farmers’ production decision each period be constrained as follows:
nit 6< n0it if ∃n ∈ (nit, n0it) :
∂
∂nit
pi(mit, n) > pi
0
i
where n0it is the farmer’s initial allowance allocation, and pi0i is the minimum return
farmer i expects from their farming activities for each unit of emissions.
This constraint results in a lower bound on nitrogen allowance holdings n`it,
such that a farmer will always hold at least n`it allowances, unless their initial allo-
cation is less than this lower bound (n0it < n`it). If this is the case the farmer will hold
at least n0it allowances.
The introduction of this constraint in the inertia model leads to the following
behavior by farmers:
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• Farmers will purchase allowances if, given their technology, the profit from
their marginal allowance exceeds the price of allowances (when ∂pi
∂n
> pt).
• Farmers will only sell allowances if, given their technology, the profit from
their marginal allowance is less than pi0i (when
∂pi
∂n
< pi0i ). This means that farm-
ers may not sell allowances even if the profit from their marginal allowance is
less that the value of the allowances (when ∂pi
∂n
< pt).
• Farmers will use only their initial allowances (neither buying or selling) if,
given their technology, the profit from their marginal allowance is less than
the price of allowances, but the profit from their marginal allowance exceeds
pi0i (when pi0i <
∂pi
∂n
< pt).
The impact of this additional constraint in the inertia model will depend on
how farmers are allocated their initial allowance holdings. If farmers’ initial al-
locations are close to their equilibrium allowance holdings then this constraint is
unlikely to result in significant increases in the cost of reducing nutrient emissions.
However, if farmers’ initial allocation are far from their equilibrium allowance hold-
ings then this constraint is likely to result in significant increases in costs.
While it is straight forward to introduce this constraint into the farmer level
model given in section 2.2, a full examination of this behavior would require us to
consider how farmers’ refusals to trade would change over time, and has been left
for future research.
Appendix C
Solving a System of First Order Linear
Difference Equations
In this appendix we demonstrate the solution to a two equation system of first order
linear difference equations. Our notation and methodology follows notes prepared
by Akila Weerapana (of Wellesley College, 2005).1
Consider the system of first order linear difference equations expressed as:[
m1t
m2t
]
=
[
u1 u2
u3 u4
]
×
[
m1,t−1
m2,t−1
]
+
[
v1
v2
]
Or alternatively, using matrix notation, as:
Mt = U ×Mt−1 + V
where
Mt =
[
m1t
m2t
]
, U =
[
u1 u2
u3 u4
]
, V =
[
v1
v2
]
.
We first find a matrix C that will diagonalize U . This will enable us to reduce
the problem to two subproblems, each regarding a univariate difference equation.
We require that U is diagonalizable.
In the two equation system, the eigenvalues of U are:
λa =
(u1 + u4) +
√
4u2u3 + (u1 + u4)2
2
,
λb =
(u1 + u4)−
√
4u2u3 + (u1 + u4)2
2
.
1These are available online at www.wellesley.edu/Economics/weerapana/econ300/
econ300pdf/lecture%20300-18.pdf. Accessed October, 2012.
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If we assume u1 is non-zero, the corresponding eigenvectors can be expressed as:[
λa − u4
u3
]
and
[
λb − u4
u3
]
Let C be the 2× 2 matrix with columns equal to the eigenvectors of U , and let
Λ be the diagonal matrix with diagonal entries equal to the eigenvalues of U .
C =
[
λa − u4 λb − u4
u3 u3
]
, C−1 =
1
u3(λa − λb)
[
u3 −λb + u4
−u3 λa − u4
]
, Λ =
[
λa 0
0 λb
]
.
It follows that we can diagonalize U as CΛC−1.
Consider the following:
Mt = UMt−1 + V
Mt = CΛC
−1Mt−1 + V
C−1Mt = ΛC−1Mt−1 + C−1V
If we define Zt = C−1Mt then we can express the system in terms of Z as follows:
Zt = ΛZt−1 + C−1V
Since Λ is diagonal, this is now a collection of univariate difference equations:
z1t = λaz1,t−1 +
v1u3 − v2(λb − v4)
u3(λa − λb) ,
z2t = λaz1,t−1 +
−v1u3 + v2(λa − v4)
u3(λa − λb) .
Univariate difference equations are straightforward to solve. The solutions for z1t
and z2t are given as follows:
z˙1t =
v1u3 − v2(λb − v4)
u3(λa − λb)
1− λat
1− λa ,
z˙2t =
−v1u3 + v2(λa − v4)
u3(λa − λb)
1− λat
1− λb .
Given this result we can construct the solution to the original system of dif-
ference equations according to the relationship Mt = CZt. This gives the following
results:
m1t = (λa − u4)z˙1t + (λb − u4)z˙2t ,
m2t = u3z˙1t + u3z˙2t ,
where z˙1t and z˙2t are the solutions to the univariate difference equations given im-
mediately above, and λa and λb are the eigenvalues of U .
Appendix D
Kernel Density Smoothing
In this appendix we provide a brief introduction to kernel density estimation. Our
notation and explanations draw on material by Pagan & Ullah (1999) and Maciejew-
ski (2011). Wand & Jones (1995) provide a dedicated introduction to kernel smooth-
ing.
Kernel density estimation can be thought of as a continuous equivalent to his-
tograms. Both histograms and kernel density estimation provide a non-parametric
means of visualizing the distribution of sample observations. But while histograms
group observations into discrete bins, kernel density estimation uses a weighting of
all nearby observations.
In its simplest form, kernel density smoothing can be expressed as:
fˆ(x) =
1
Nh
N∑
i=1
K
(x− xi
h
)
,
where fˆ(x) is our estimate for the density at x, N is the number of observations, h
is the kernel smoothing parameter, xi are the sample data, and K(·) is the kernel
estimator.
The kernel estimator is the equivalent of the bin width when constructing a
histogram. The kernel estimator determines how close sample observations xi have
to be to x to affect the density at x, and how large an effect they have on the density.
The most common kernel is the Gaussian (or normal) kernel.
Consider for example the following simple kernel density estimator. At each
point x the density at the point will be estimated by the number of sample observa-
tions within an interval of length h centered on x.
fˆ(x) =
1
Nh
N∑
i=1
I
(
x− h
2
≤ xi ≤ x+ h
2
)
,
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where I(φ) = 1 if φ is true and zero otherwise. It is obvious that this provides a con-
tinuous estimate for the density function as any value of x can be chosen. However,
as we are still considering observations within some interval we have not differed
significantly from the construction of a histogram.
Kernel density estimations used in practice are significantly more sophisti-
cated. In particular, the width of the interval may vary as a function of the data and
observations within an interval may not all carry equal weight. We provide only a
brief discussion of each of these aspects.
Just as an appropriate choice of bin widths in a histogram is crucial, so also
is the interval width in kernel density smoothing. Narrow intervals may not pro-
vide sufficient smoothing, and wide intervals may result in excess smoothing (for
example consider the two extremes for a histograms: when no observations share
the same bin - not enough smoothing, and when all observations share the same bin
- too much smoothing). Adaptive measures of kernel density estimation attempt to
adjust the interval width based on the local density of the data. This means that
where observations are more clustered (near the mode or modes) smaller interval
widths are used and where observations are less clustered (near the tails) larger
interval widths are used. Adaptive measures of kernel density estimation are fre-
quently based on the distance to the k-th nearest neighbor.
Consider the simplistic example we give above: an observation counts to-
wards the density at x if it falls within the interval x ± h/2. In this case, our kernel
density estimator ignores where in the interval an observation falls. We would ex-
pect that an interval with observations clustered near the middle would suggest a
higher density than an interval with observations spread uniformly across it. More
sophisticated kernel density estimation uses the distance |x − xi| to determine the
significance of observations within any given interval. In our analysis in this paper,
the Gaussian distribution has been used for this purpose.
